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CHARACTERIZING CONSTITUTIONAL
INPUTS
MICHAEL COENEN†
ABSTRACT
Constitutional doctrine frequently employs tests that operate on
abstract conceptual inputs rather than objectively identifiable facts.
Consider some examples: substantive due process doctrine directs
attention to whether a violated “right” qualifies as fundamental or
nonfundamental; Commerce Clause doctrine directs attention to
whether a regulated “activity” qualifies as economic or noneconomic;
the strict scrutiny test directs attention to whether a relevant
“government interest” qualifies as compelling or noncompelling; and
so forth. These sorts of decision rules call for an evaluation of variables
whose scope, content, and character are frequently up for debate,
thereby requiring courts to characterize constitutional inputs as a
precondition to reaching constitutional results. To determine whether
the government has violated a “fundamental right,” courts must first
characterize the relevant right whose fundamentality is at issue. To
determine whether a congressional enactment regulates an “economic
activity,” courts must first characterize the relevant activity whose
economic nature must be scrutinized. To determine whether a
challenged law pursues a “compelling government interest,” courts
must first characterize the relevant government interest whose
importance is to be assessed. Tests of this sort thus implicate not just
the familiar judicial challenge of evaluating a given variable by
reference to an established doctrinal criterion, but also the less familiar
(and often unnoticed) challenge of extracting from a fact pattern an
operative characterization of the variable to be evaluated.
This Article examines these input-characterization problems as a
general challenge of constitutional decisionmaking. The Article makes
three contributions. First, the Article demonstrates the widespread
presence of characterization problems within constitutional law,
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highlighting both the broad range of contexts in which these problems
arise and the limited amount of attention they have thus far generated.
Second, the Article explores the possibility of avoiding inputcharacterization problems through the reformulation of constitutional
decision rules, considering in particular the tradeoffs implicated by the
replacement of “characterization-dependent” decision rules with
“characterization-resistant” alternatives. Finally, the Article works
through the various methods by which courts might confront
characterization problems on their own terms, asking whether there
exist reliable and predictable means of selecting an authoritative input
characterization from the many possibilities that the facts might afford.
In sum, this analysis reveals that input-characterization problems are
neither easily avoidable nor easily solvable, thus raising critical
questions regarding the determinacy and coherence of the doctrine writ
large.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you have given me a collection of photographs and
invited me to take from that collection any and all pictures of things
that make me happy. I accept your invitation and start looking for
photos to claim. Adhering strictly to your instructions, I ask with
respect to each photo, “Does the subject of this picture make me
happy?,” and I select only those photos for which the answer to this
question is “yes.” Some photos are easy to deal with: I eagerly grab the
photo of the dog, and I fervently reject the photo of smog. Others
present a more complex calculus: I’m initially flummoxed by the
photograph of a computer—sometimes computers make me happy,
other times they do not—but I ultimately decide that my overall
feelings toward computers are more positive than negative and thus
add the photo to my pile. And I continue to make similar such
judgments on a photo-by-photo basis, generally satisfied in my ability
to distinguish between things that do and do not make me happy.
Suddenly, however, I hit a roadblock1:

My problem is this: I know that the earth makes me happy and I
know that the moon does not, but I cannot figure out whether this is a
picture of the earth or of the moon. Worse still, I worry that the picture
might depict something other than “the earth” or “the moon”: perhaps
it depicts “outer space,” “sunlight,” “celestial orbs,” “Earth as seen

1. As best I can gather, this photograph was taken by William Anders during the Apollo 8
mission, on December 24, 1968. Earthrise (photograph), NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_1249.html [https://perma.cc/BA
9B-XX9A].
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from the moon,” “Earthrise over the moon,” or even “what the Apollo
8 astronauts saw on December 24, 1968.”
And then I start to wonder about other choices that I previously
made. Was that photo of a dog really a photo of “a dog,” or was it a
photo of “a snarling guard dog”? Was that photo of smog really a photo
of “smog,” or was it a photo of “a somewhat obscured urban center”?
Was that photo of a computer really a photo of “a computer,” or was
it a photo of “an Apple IIC computer,” or was it a photo of “plastic”?
I am identifying more and more potential subjects of each photograph,
some more happy-seeming than others, but all of which strike me as
equally valid characterizations of the images with which they are
associated. And yet, I somehow must choose only one characterization
out of each multitude in order to decide what to do with the picture it
describes.
Suppose now that I am a judge tasked with deciding the following
case.
Patient is suffering from a terminal illness and anticipates death within
the year. Patient very much wishes to die on her own terms, rather than
drag herself and her family through the painful ordeal of a slow
medical decline. Patient asks Doctor to administer life-ending
treatment, but Doctor refuses, citing to a state-law prohibition on
“causing the death of a person.” Patient claims that the law violates the
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.2

Having recently studied up on substantive due process doctrine, I
know that my disposition of this claim will depend on whether the
“right” being asserted by the plaintiff qualifies as “fundamental” or
“nonfundamental,”3 and I know how I should go about assessing a
right’s fundamentality. Here too, however, I encounter a problem: I am
not sure how to characterize the right whose fundamentality I should
assess. Is Patient asserting a “right to commit suicide,” a “right to
demand physician-assisted suicide,” a “right to die with dignity,” a
“right to refuse to continue living,” a “right to spare one’s family
members of emotional pain,” a “right to make decisions about one’s

2. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (presenting a similar fact pattern).
3. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 826
(5th ed. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they are
deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’ and that generally the government cannot infringe upon them
unless strict scrutiny is met.”).
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own body,” or some other “right” altogether?4 Some of these rights
seem more fundamental than others, but before I can even get to the
question of fundamentality, I have to extract from the fact pattern a
claim of right to be assessed. And this is no easy task. All of the rights
I have considered strike me as descriptively accurate characterizations
of the facts I am confronting, and yet I must select one and only one
such characterization as the basis for my disposition of the substantive
due process claim.
These two hypotheticals—the first, a figment of my imagination,
the second, an adaptation of Washington v. Glucksberg5—highlight
what I call the challenge of input characterization (or, the challenge of
characterization, for short). This challenge arises whenever we must
characterize factual information (for example, a photographic image
or the fact pattern of a case) in terms of an abstract concept (the subject
of the photograph or the right implicated by the case), which we then
proceed to evaluate by reference to an operative criterion (is the
subject of the photograph a “thing that makes me happy”?; is the right
“fundamental” or “nonfundamental”?). The task is challenging
because facts are often susceptible to large numbers of competing
characterizations, and we have no obvious means of choosing a
particular characterization to serve as the input for our evaluative
inquiry. And the task is important because the characterization choices
that we make will often influence, if not wholly dictate, the result of
that inquiry itself.
These challenges are by no means unfamiliar to constitutional
scholars, many of whom have commented on the importance and
difficulty of defining the proper level of generality with which to frame
the subject of a given doctrinal inquiry.6 As I understand it, however,
4. Many of these formulations were proposed and considered throughout the litigation of
Glucksberg itself. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724 (referring to the “right to commit suicide
with another’s assistance”); id. at 722 (referring to the “right to choose a humane, dignified
death”); id. at 755 (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to the “right to physician assistance”).
5. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
6. Most of the commentary concerns the particular problem of defining rights for purposes
of substantive due process doctrine. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084
(1981) (noting that “[t]he levels-of-abstraction problem is pervasive, infecting theories of
adjudication based on rights and consensus as well as tradition”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael
C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1065 (1990)
(“Rightly or wrongly, the battle for constitutional meaning occurs primarily in the interpretation
of prior cases. And competing characterizations of the level of generality at which to describe
rights often constitute the principal weapons in that battle.”); Anthony S. Winer, Levels of
Generality and the Protection of LGBT Rights Before the United Nations General Assembly, 41
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the challenge of characterization implicates more than just the wellknown levels-of-generality problem. Characterization choices, in other
words, implicate not just questions about generality, but also questions
about what descriptive features of a fact pattern to include in—and
exclude from—the doctrinal inputs that judges end up evaluating.7 We
might all agree, for instance, that I should characterize the NASA
photograph at a low level of generality, but that fact alone does not tell
us whether the characterization should be “the Earth on December 24,
1968,” or “the Earth as seen by the crew of Apollo 8.” Similarly, we
might all agree that the right at issue in Glucksberg merited a highgenerality characterization, but that fact alone does not tell us whether
the characterization should have been a “right to die with dignity,” a
“right to die with a physician’s assistance,” or a “right to die at a time
of one’s own choosing.”8 I will elaborate on this point further in the
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 91–100 (2015) (evaluating how levels of generality affect judicial
decisions). See generally John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the
Characterization of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2005)
(analyzing how courts characterize fundamental rights). Some commentators, though, have noted
the existence of similar problems within and across other domains as well. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen,
Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 585 n.167 (1999) (noting that “levels of generality problems pervade
qualified immunity, Teague, and [other habeas questions],” while analogizing to levels of
generality problems that arise in the context of substantive due process doctrine); David L.
Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 778–83 (1994)
(discussing the importance of characterization choices in connection with inquiries that require a
balancing of “liberty interests” against “government interests”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict
Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1271 (2007) (“Although it is widely recognized that
courts must determine the ‘level of generality’ at which constitutional rights should be defined . . .
the Court has largely ignored parallel questions involving the generality with which government
interests should be specified.”); Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 275 (2014)
(noting “the central place of state interest definition in constitutional adjudication,” while noting
the Court’s “‘astonishingly casual approach’ to articulating or evaluating those sources of
government concern that ambiguous interests comprise” (quoting Fallon, supra, at 1321)); Mark
V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1983) (“Frequently an analysis turns completely on the level of
generality at which some feature of the issue under analysis is described.”).
7. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1091 (highlighting this difficulty).
8. In this sense, the characterization of constitutional inputs bears some similarity to what
Mark Kelman has described as the process of “interpretive construction” within U.S. criminal
law. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 593–97 (1981). In deciding criminal cases, judges must often engage in processes whereby
“concrete situations are reduced to substantive legal controversies.” Id. at 592. Thus, for instance,
in assessing the blameworthiness of a defendant’s conduct, judges must first select a “relevant
time frame,” which may or may not include “some obviously voluntary act that contributes to the
ultimate harm.” Id. Similarly, judges often choose whether to represent a fact pattern in terms of
a single “unified” incident or as a series of “disjoined” incidents, and that choice in turn can affect
their assessment of the legal claims that the parties have raised. See id. at 616–20. Within criminal
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discussion below,9 but for now it suffices to say that the levels-ofgenerality problem represents only one aspect of the problem that I am
considering here. With that broader understanding of the problem in
place, we are more likely to notice its occurrence across many different
areas of constitutional law.
Indeed, a central claim of this Article is that the challenge of input
characterization presents a pervasive problem for judges tasked with
deciding constitutional cases.10 In case after constitutional case,
involving clause after constitutional clause, courts must characterize
complex bodies of factual details in terms of a single abstract concept
that a decision rule demands. Glucksberg illustrates this point with
respect to substantive due process doctrine: the case law distinguishes
between claims involving fundamental and nonfundamental rights, and
it thus requires courts to extract from each case’s fact pattern a
characterization of the relevant right whose fundamentality can then
be gauged.11 But characterization problems arise with equal frequency
in many other domains. To determine whether a federal court plaintiff
has Article III standing, one must first characterize the plaintiff’s
various burdens, grievances, indignities, and other harms in terms of a
single “injury” whose concreteness, traceability, and redressability can
then be evaluated.12 To determine whether a law survives strict
scrutiny, one must characterize the complex cluster of problems,
policies, objectives, and effects of the law in terms of a “government
interest” whose overall importance and closeness of fit can then be
evaluated.13 To determine whether a federal law preempts a state law,
one must characterize various facts about each law as a description of
each law’s regulatory “field” before then proceeding to address
whether those fields problematically overlap.14 This list could go on,
but the key point is simply that constitutional decision rules frequently
operate on abstract characterizations of the facts rather than directly
on the facts themselves. And where that is so, courts must characterize
law, that is, “a legal-sounding argument can be made only after a situation is characterized
nonrationally, so that the advocate seems able to deduce a single result on principle.” Id. at 592.
This Article attempts to show that a similar phenomenon is at work within various areas of
constitutional doctrine as well.
9. For a criticism of different approaches to characterization problems that focus
exclusively on calibrating generality levels, see infra Part IV.A.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.E.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.F.
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constitutional inputs as a precondition to generating constitutional
results.
This fact is not problematic in and of itself, but it becomes
problematic when another fact comes to light. And that fact, which I
will also endeavor to demonstrate in the pages below, is that the
Supreme Court does not often pause to defend, let alone acknowledge,
the characterization choices that it makes. All too often, contestable
characterizations of the facts are simply adopted without explanation,
buried within elaborate and involved discussions as to why one
decision rule or another should be adopted or why a characterized
input does or does not satisfy the terms of the decision rule being
applied. The Court has told us much about how it evaluates the
fundamentality of an unenumerated right, but it has told us relatively
little about how it goes about characterizing the particular right that a
given case implicates. Similarly, the Court has told us much about what
distinguishes a mere “generalized grievance” from a cognizable injuryin-fact, but it has told us relatively little about how it goes about
characterizing the particular injury that a plaintiff claims to have
suffered. The Court has told us much about what sorts of government
interests qualify as “compelling,” but it has told us relatively little
about how it goes about identifying the relevant interest that a given
law pursues. To be sure, not all of the Court’s characterization choices
have been rendered so casually; some choices have been conducted out
in the open, although even here the justifications for those choices have
been largely unilluminating. But given the frequency with which the
Court characterizes its constitutional inputs, it is both surprising and
concerning that the Justices have had so little to say about how courts
should go about performing this important task.
This Article aims to draw attention to a vital yet largely
underappreciated facet of the Court’s constitutional work. It begins in
Part I by explaining in more detail how characterization choices fit into
the constitutional decisionmaking process and why characterization
choices are worth examining as a unitary and “trans-substantive”
problem of constitutional law. With the brush thus cleared, Part II
proceeds to advance the two major descriptive claims of the Article,
demonstrating first, that many different decision rules of constitutional
law operate on inputs that can only be identified via contestable
characterizations of the facts, and second, that courts only rarely offer
satisfactory justifications—or for that matter any justifications at all—
for the characterization choices they have made. The challenge of
characterization, in short, is as widespread as it is underexamined,
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making it all the more important for us to analyze the structure of the
problem it presents.
The remainder of this Article takes up that task. Part III looks at
the challenge of characterization through the lens of decision rule
design. This Part considers the possibility of crafting constitutional
doctrine in such a way as to minimize the decisional influence of
characterization choices—in effect, responding to the challenge of
characterization by rendering difficult characterization choices
irrelevant to the application of a given legal norm. This strategy might
be pursued in one of three ways. First, the Court might prescribe
decision rules that operate on specifically described and easily
identifiable features of a fact pattern, calling for the assessment of
targeted inputs drawn directly from the facts.15 Second, and at the
opposite extreme, the Court might prescribe decision rules that
operate on the entirety of a given fact pattern, calling for a holistic and
all-things-considered assessment of all aspects of a transaction giving
rise to a case.16 Finally, even where a decision rule operates on a
characterized input, courts might attempt to neutralize the influence of
the characterization choice by installing equilibrating or self-corrective
mechanisms into the decision rule itself.17 These three strategies, I
argue, can and sometimes do succeed at producing various forms of
characterization-resistant constitutional doctrine. But they will not
always be available for courts to use. And when that is so, courts have
no choice but to confront the challenge of characterization head on.
15. Consider, for instance, rules that accord differing levels of First Amendment protection
based on whether a defamation plaintiff qualifies as a public or nonpublic figure. See, e.g., Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); see
also Stephen J. Mattingly, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the Public-Concern Test in the
Constitutional Law of Defamation Is Harmful to the First Amendment, and What Courts Should
Do About It, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739, 742 (2009) (noting that New York Times and Butts
“established that the status of a defamation plaintiff determined the contours of the protection
afforded to the speech in question”).
16. Consider, for instance, the Court’s suggestion that the “reasonableness” of a given search
be assessed by reference to the “totality of circumstances” accompanying the search. See, e.g.,
Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) (“The reasonableness of a
search depends on the totality of the circumstances . . . .”).
17. Consider, for instance, the various forms of means/ends analysis, in which the breadth of
a characterized government interest might simultaneously militate in favor of a finding that the
interest qualifies as “compelling” and militate against a finding that the challenge law is “narrowly
tailored” to serve that interest. See Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal
Protection: A Study of Judicial Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 447 (1998) (noting that “as
[government] interests are defined more narrowly, they become less important,” while also noting
that “as interests are defined more generally, they become less related to the government policy
at issue”).
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Part IV thus considers how courts should go about characterizing
constitutional inputs. More specifically, it considers three different
strategies for constraining characterization choices, asking how and
according to what guideposts courts should select a particular
characterization of the facts. The first strategy attempts to constrain
characterization choices by prescribing the requisite level of generality
with which a relevant input should be characterized. (If, for instance, I
had been instructed to characterize the subject of each photograph at
a “high” level of generality, I would have had some basis for concluding
that a photo depicted a “dog” rather than a “snarling guard-dog.”) But
this strategy can only achieve so much, encountering limitations that
result both from the difficulty of communicating and measuring desired
generality levels and from the reality that multiple competing
characterizations will often exist at the same overall level of
abstraction. The second strategy employs what I call results-based
characterization; utilizing this strategy, the Court would simply instruct
its subordinates to characterize inputs in whatever manner is most
likely to produce the correct-seeming outcome under the decision rule
being applied. (As applied to the example of the photographs, this
strategy would instruct me to ask first whether a picture makes me feel
happy and then to characterize the photograph in terms of a “subject”
that accords with this feeling.) In contrast to the generality-based
strategy, this strategy is at least sometimes capable of generating
determinate and predictable characterization choices, but it will also
have the effect of rendering the operative decision rule largely
irrelevant to the decision it purports to guide. Finally, the Court might
call for precedent-driven characterization choices, instructing courts to
characterize constitutional inputs in a manner that coheres with
characterization choices made in previous, similar cases. (If, for
instance, I had previously characterized a picture with a dog in it as a
“picture of a dog,” that strategy would instruct me to do the same thing
in connection with similarly canine-focused pictures.) This strategy
likewise carries only limited promise: among other things, the
precedent-driven approach may impose undue cognitive burdens on
the decisionmaker and may be impossible to pursue without once again
converting the process into a doctrinally irrelevant sideshow.
The bad news, then, is that the analysis in Part IV fails to identify
an approach to characterization choices that qualifies as both
nonarbitrary and nonduplicative of the inquiry it purports to guide. All
is not lost, however, as Part V attempts to sketch out a different
understanding of the role that characterization choices might play in
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the resolution of constitutional cases. The suggestion here is that
characterization choices, along with the decision rules to which they
attach, might make more sense when understood as an output-focused
rather than input-focused phenomenon—concerned less with dictating
results ex ante than they are with communicating a set of judgments
that would otherwise resist easy description. That observation, in turn,
might prompt a broader reexamination of the purposes and benefits of
constitutional decision rules. In particular, the suggestion is that, to the
extent that characterization-dependent decision rules afford benefits
to the doctrine as a whole, those benefits may have more to do with the
appearance of continuity across cases rather than with the actuality of
the same. The suggestions here are largely tentative, but they do, I
hope, at least demonstrate the importance of thinking carefully about
the challenge of characterization and its relationship to the broader
challenge of deciding constitutional cases over time.
I. THE CHARACTERIZATION PROCESS
A. Basic Model of Constitutional Adjudication
To understand the challenge of characterization, it may help to
begin with an idealized account of how constitutional decisionmaking
works. Constitutional litigation, like any other area of litigation,
requires attention to both the law and the facts. To decide a
constitutional case, a court must identify the applicable rule, identify
the relevant facts, and then apply the rule to those facts.
With this picture in view, we can identify three tasks of importance
to the enterprise. The first is that of fact identification—the
development of a factual record against which to resolve the
constitutional question before the court.18 Fact identification can occur
in a number of different ways, depending on the issues or procedural
posture of a case: the parties might stipulate certain facts, some facts
might be assumed, other facts might be found by a judge or jury, and
so-called legislative facts might find their way into the case via amicus
briefs or independent judicial research. These processes in turn
generate different types of information: they might tell us, for instance,

18. For useful investigations into the various challenges to which this process gives rise, see
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS (2008); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding,
98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012).
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what was said during a traffic stop; they might tell us about the content
of a television broadcast that triggered FCC penalties; or they might
tell us about a state’s history of enforcing a challenged law. The process
can sometimes be arduous, and it can at other times proceed quickly.
But however the fact-finding process takes place, its underlying
purpose is the same: generating information about a legal dispute and
the broader environment in which it operates.19
Second, courts must identify the applicable law. Call this the task
of rule identification. In one sense, rule identification in constitutional
cases is easy to do: if a litigant asserts a constitutional claim, the
applicable rule is the Constitution itself. But rarely does the abstract
language of the Constitution provide much in the way of concrete
guidance. More frequently, that guidance comes from the various
decision rules of Supreme Court doctrine that specify how to go about
resolving a given constitutional claim. Equal protection doctrine, for
instance, instructs courts to apply strict scrutiny when reviewing laws
that employ race-based classifications;20 Spending Clause doctrine calls
for courts to apply a multifactor test when reviewing a conditional
spending program;21 procedural due process doctrine requires courts to
apply the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge22 when
evaluating the adequacy of procedural safeguards;23 and so forth. For
frequently litigated issues, one identifies the applicable rule simply by
looking up the relevant judicial precedents and reciting the standards
they set forth. Where the precedents are sparser, rule identification

19. I should note that—perhaps unconventionally—I will sometimes understand the relevant
facts of a constitutional case to include materials of a formally legal character. For example, in a
Commerce Clause challenge to a newly enacted piece of federal legislation, my conceptual
framework would treat the legislation itself as a fact rather than as a rule that is of relevance to
the constitutional decision. In such a case, after all, the challenged legislation would be operating
as an object of, rather than source of, the legal analysis that the court conducts, becoming, in
effect, one of several data points feeding into the question of whether a claimant’s Commerce
Clause argument should fail or succeed. This is not to say that the challenged legislation could not
function as a rule in another case; we would understand it to be the governing rule, for instance,
in a criminal prosecution presenting the question whether a defendant acted in violation of the
legislation itself. But where the legislation is itself the object of a constitutional inquiry, it is more
accurately characterized as a fact on which the relevant decision rule operates.
20. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly, we
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
21. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (listing four factors for
evaluating a conditional spending program).
22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
23. Id. at 335.
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might involve the formulation of a new decision rule informed by
judgments about text, history, structure, policy, and so forth.24 Rule
identification, in short, begins with the various sources of constitutional
law and ends with some combination of tests, presumptions,
formulations, exceptions, and other directives that courts have
developed to facilitate the implementation of an abstract constitutional
norm.
With the law and the facts on the table, a decisionmaker can then
proceed to apply the former to the latter, thus carrying out the final,
outcome-determinative task of rule application.25 Is a particular
government interest “compelling” enough to survive strict scrutiny? If
so, is a particular race-based classification “narrowly tailored” to serve
that interest? Is a particular conditional spending program unduly
“coercive”? Does a given set of procedures satisfy the Mathews v.
24. More specifically, I understand the rule identification enterprise to encompass two
different sorts of determinations that courts routinely make. First, the rule identification process
will sometimes involve the resolution of interpretive questions about the meaning of the
constitutional text, with courts identifying an operative proposition of constitutional law by
selecting one out of several plausible readings of a given textual provision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561–67 (2014) (reading the phrase “the recess” in the Recess
Appointments Clause to refer both to intra-session and inter-session recesses of Congress).
Second, the rule identification process will sometimes involve the creation of judge-made decision
rules to facilitate the implementation of whatever the operative proposition is identified to be.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (setting forth a particularized warning
requirement as a means of enforcing the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled
confessions); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 51
(2004) (distinguishing between “constitutional operative propositions (essentially, judgeinterpreted constitutional meaning) and constitutional decision rules (rules that direct courts how
to decide whether a given operative proposition has been, or will be, complied with)”); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997)
(contending that the task of “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is not the Court’s
only function” and that the Court must also “craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but
does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning precisely”); Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010) (distinguishing between
“interpretation,” which is “the process (or activity) that recognizes or discovers the linguistic
meaning or semantic content of the legal text,” and “construction,” which is “the process that
gives a text legal effect”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 190, 207 (1988) (noting that “courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account
both the principles and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institutional
realities”). For ease of exposition, I will generally refer to the output of the rule identification
process as a “decision rule” of constitutional doctrine; but I should emphasize that I do not intend
to suggest that the process is wholly unrelated to the interpretive challenge of extracting meaning
from the constitutional text.
25. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 24, at 35–36 (noting the “mediating function that
constitutional rules play between the logically prior judicial announcement of constitutional
meaning and the logically subsequent application of law to facts”); see also id. at 58–59
(elaborating on this model).
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Eldridge balancing test? To answer these questions, judges must assess
a case’s factual particularities in light of the various evaluative criteria
that the applicable decision rule has set forth. And once these
assessments have been made, a court can cite to the applicable decision
rule as justifying the outcome it has reached: if the government interest
is not compelling or the classification is insufficiently tailored, the law
must be struck down. If the conditional spending program is
impermissibly coercive, the spending program cannot stand. If the
government interests outweigh the liberty interests, and if the risk of
an erroneous deprivation is minimal, a court should uphold the
procedural rules under review. Rule application marks the stage of the
inquiry where law and fact come together—the identified decision rule
takes the identified fact pattern as its input and yields a legal
disposition as its output.
Figure 1: Basic Model of Constitutional Adjudication

All of this is diagrammed above. Every constitutional case starts
with two fixed points: (1) the Constitution,26 and (2) the world as we
26. Although my model characterizes the Constitution as the starting point of the rule
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know it. The rule identification process takes us from the Constitution
to an operative decision rule, whereas the fact identification process
extracts from the world a fact pattern to be evaluated under the
decision rule. The law application process then combines the decision
rule with the fact pattern to produce the ultimate outcome of the case.
B. Adding Input Characterization Into the Mix
Thus far, our model has omitted reference to the characterization
of constitutional inputs. We can now bring that process into the picture
by noting that many decision rules require an assessment of something
other than unvarnished facts about the real world. When, for instance,
qualified immunity doctrine instructs the courts to evaluate whether a
violated rule qualifies as “clearly established,”27 the relevant facts will
not yield a single agreed-upon description of what that relevant rule is.
Similarly, when substantive due process doctrine instructs the courts to
determine whether the plaintiff’s liberty interest is fundamental,
knowing what happened between the plaintiff and the government is
not the same as knowing what particular liberty interest the plaintiff
seeks to protect. The fact identification process gives us a detailed
snapshot of a particular dispute, but the snapshot is not always the
input that we need. This is where the challenge of characterization
comes in—courts must organize a case’s fact pattern into terms and
concepts that the operative decision rule can understand.28
A further analogy may help to illustrate the idea. Suppose that a
identification inquiry, nothing of much significance for our purposes turns on the question of
whether the Constitution itself exhausts the content of U.S. constitutional law. See, e.g., Ernest
A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 410 (2007) (“[T]he
American ‘constitution’ consists of a much wider range of legal materials than the document
ratified in 1789 and its subsequent amendments.”). The central assumption of the model, rather,
is that there exists some set of sources of constitutional law—including but not necessarily limited
to the constitutional text—and that the rule identification process involves the translation of those
the sources into rules of decision that courts can apply.
27. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that “government
officials performing discretionary functions . . . generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).
28. This understanding is reminiscent of Mark Kelman’s suggestion that “legal argument has
two phases,” the first of which, “interpretive construction,” involves “the way we construe a
factual situation and . . . the way we frame the possible rules to handle the situation,” and the
second of which, “rational rhetoricism,” involves “the process of presenting the legal conclusions
that result when interpretive constructs are applied to the ‘facts.’” Kelman, supra note 8, at 591–
92. In a rough sense, the characterization of constitutional inputs may be seen as a form of what
Kelman calls “interpretive construction,” whereas the evaluation of those inputs in terms of a preestablished decision rule may be seen as a form of what Kelman calls “rational rhetoricism.”
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friend asks me whether the opening chord to “A Hard Day’s Night” is
major or minor in character. Suppose further that I have managed to
identify all of the individual notes sounding from all of the individual
instruments at the beginning of the song.29 I have, in other words,
identified an applicable rule (namely, evaluate whether the chord is
major or minor) and I have gathered all the relevant facts (the notes
being played at the beginning of the song). But I am not yet able to
answer my friend’s question, because the decision rule operates on the
singular, abstract input of a “chord.” Consequently, before I can
discern the major or minor nature of the opening chord of “A Hard
Day’s Night,” I first must restate that collection of notes in the
conceptual language of a chord. Do the notes comprise a “G-seven
chord with a suspended fourth”? A “D-minor-11 chord”? An “Fmajor-seven-add-9 chord”? Or some other chord altogether? As it
turns out, these—and many other—labels all offer plausible harmonic
descriptions of the collection of notes that I hear at the beginning of
the song,30 and no additional fact finding will shed light on the question
of which particular description I should employ. I must therefore make
a characterization choice, tagging one of these descriptions as the
relevant “chord” to serve as the basis for the answer to my friend’s
question.
We can thus visualize the characterization process as a sometimesnecessary intermediate step between the fact identification and law
application stages of the decisionmaking process.31 In our example
29. As it happens, this information only recently became available. See Damian Fanelli,
Beatles Multitracks Reveal True “A Hard Day’s Night” Opening Chord, GUITAR WORLD (Nov.
6, 2015), http://www.guitarworld.com/beatles-multitracks-reveal-true-hard-days-night-chordvideo [https://perma.cc/KD8K-SUEE].
30. Compare, e.g., TONY BACON, FUZZ AND FEEDBACK: CLASSICAL GUITAR MUSIC OF
THE 60’S, at 5 (2000) (characterizing the chord as a Dm7sus4), with DOMINIC PEDLER, THE
SONGWRITING SECRETS OF THE BEATLES 478–79 (2003) (quoting George Harrison’s
characterization of the chord as an Fadd9). Whether Harrison’s own characterization of the chord
should carry special weight is an interesting question, but it is one, alas, that lies outside the scope
of this Article.
31. I should note here that I understand the challenge of input characterization to be
materially different from what David Faigman has elsewhere called problem of defining the
“proper frame of reference for deciding constitutional cases.” See FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 78.
See generally David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases:
Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 631 (2009) (exploring the relationship between liberty and government interests).
Constitutional outcomes, as Faigman has demonstrated, often depend on what types of factual
findings the Court should demand when deciding a given case, with the Court sometimes looking
to findings that are true at the case-specific level and at other times looking to findings that are
true in a more systemic sense. Faigman’s “frame of reference” question, in other words, goes not

COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2018 3:12 PM

2018] CHARACTERIZING CONSTITUTIONAL INPUTS

759

above, it was a process that took us from a collection of notes to a
description of a chord. In law, it is the process that takes us from the
text and legislative history of a congressional statute to a description of
the “activity” that the statute regulates; from a transcript of statements
made by a protester to a description of the “matter” that the protester
discussed; from data about the history and effects of a regulation to a
description of the liberty interests and/or government interests that it
implicates. It takes as its input what we might call a raw fact pattern—
a timeline of events, the text of a challenged law, the testimony of a
government official—and it generates as its output a characterized
factual input—a label, concept, or descriptive statement that can be
plugged into the decision rule we are applying.
C. Characterization Versus Evaluation
As the foregoing discussion suggests, what we call the application
of law to fact often involves—or at least purports to involve—two
distinct tasks: a characterization of facts into the language of the
requisite doctrinal input, followed by an evaluation of that input by
reference to criteria the test sets forth. For instance, when courts apply
substantive due process doctrine, they must characterize the facts in
terms of a “right” being asserted, and they must then evaluate the right
by reference to its overall “fundamentality” or “nonfundamentality.”
When courts apply qualified immunity doctrine, they must characterize
the facts in terms of a “violated rule,” and they must then evaluate the
rule by reference to its “clearly established” or not “clearly
established” nature. When courts apply the Article III standing test,
they must characterize the facts in terms of an asserted “injury” of the
plaintiff, and then evaluate that injury in terms of its concreteness,
traceability, and redressability. Questions of characterization in this
sense precede questions of evaluation. To know whether some input
satisfies the relevant doctrinal criteria, we must first identify, and hence
characterize, the descriptive contours of the input itself.

to the issue of how to characterize a factual input that the doctrine demands, but rather to the
antecedent question of what sort of factual inputs the doctrine should demand in the first place.
See FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66; see also id. at 195 n.236 (noting that “the concern over what
frame of reference applies in particular constitutional contexts is fundamentally different from
the debate sparked by Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D.”).
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Figure 2: Updated Model of Constitutional Adjudication (with
Characterization Included)

This posited distinction between characterization and evaluation
should invite an important point of skepticism: perhaps our attempt to
differentiate characterization-based questions from evaluation-based
questions will tend to obscure more than it illuminates, for the simple
reason that both types of questions ultimately implicate the same bigpicture task of applying law to fact.32 It may be formally correct to
32. A big-picture, methodological objection to this Article might as well be addressed here.
Specifically, this objection attacks this Article’s near-exclusive focus on constitutional law as
arbitrary and unnecessary. Constitutional law, after all, is by no means the only area of law in
which doctrinal rules require evaluations of abstract conceptual inputs, and there is nothing
special about constitutional cases qua constitutional cases that would require us to think about
their characterization problems any different from others. Cf. Michael Coenen, Constitutional
Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 691 (2013) (questioning the utility of the constitutional/
nonconstitutional distinction within a variety of doctrinal contexts). To this accusation, I plead
guilty as charged. Although I do not squarely confront the issue in this Article, my inclination is
to agree with the claim that characterization problems are by no means unique to the domain of
constitutional law, see, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law,
105 NW. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (2011) (evaluating an analogous set of problems that arise from
patent-law doctrines that require a characterization of the relevant “invention” that a given patent
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describe the determination that “X is or is not Y” as involving both a
characterization of the facts in terms of X followed by an evaluation of
X in terms of Y. But if the first and second steps of the inquiry turn out
to overlap with one another, then we might as well jettison the
distinction as unhelpful to the goal of better understanding the
challenge of constitutional decisionmaking. If, in other words, the
various difficulties associated with questions of characterization end up
mirroring the various difficulties associated with questions of
evaluation, then we should examine those difficulties directly and on
their own terms, without indulging any surface-level distinctions
between the contexts in which they arise.
So, before proceeding further, I want to point out two important
ways in which questions of characterization differ from questions of
evaluation, and to suggest that these differences are significant enough
to warrant the distinction I have drawn. First, unlike questions of
evaluation, questions of characterization can be both posed and
answered in purely descriptive terms: they are, on their face, valueneutral questions of “what,” rather than value-laden questions of
“whether.” Characterizing the relevant government interest implicated
by a law does not appear to involve an assessment of the strength of
the government’s justifications for that law, whereas evaluating the
importance of that interest does. Characterizing the relevant injury
suffered by a plaintiff does not require a court to express a judgment
of the Article III bona fides of the plaintiff’s complaint, whereas
evaluating the injury’s concreteness and redressability undoubtedly
does. Obviously, and as we will explore in further detail, this feature of
characterization questions does not shield them from normative
influence,33 but it does mean that such choices can mask or obscure
value-based judgments in a way that their evaluation-based

protects), and I certainly do not intend for this Article’s substantive domain to signify anything to
the contrary. This Article’s choice of focus derives instead from expositional considerations. A
comprehensive treatment of characterization problems within all different areas of law strikes me
as too big a task for a single law review article to take on, and I have thus decided to narrow the
paper’s focus to a body of cases with which I am already well familiar. Constitutional law, in other
words, strikes me as as good an area as any other within which to explore the problem of
characterization, and I do not think much is lost by limiting this Article’s focus in this way. To the
extent, moreover, that the insights I offer here turn out to be of interest and use to scholars within
other disciplines, I would regard that outcome as all to the good.
33. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 820 (1935) (noting that “in every field of law we should find the same habit of
ignoring practical questions of value or of positive fact and taking refuge in ‘legal problems’ which
can always be answered by manipulating legal concepts in certain approved ways”).
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counterparts cannot. In other words, even if questions of
characterization turn out to be irreducibly normative, they still can be
framed and disposed of in such a way as to make their motivating value
judgments more difficult for the characterizing court to notice and for
the observing reader to detect. With evaluation-based questions, by
contrast, the value-based cards are more likely to be out on the table
for everyone to see.
Second, questions of characterization—unlike questions of
evaluation—accommodate a huge range of seemingly plausible
answers. Evaluation-based questions are typically posed as binary “yes
or no” questions: “Is the right fundamental?,” “Is the government
interest compelling?,” “Is the injury concrete?,” etc.34
Characterization-based questions, by contrast, are typically posed as
open-ended interpretive inquiries: “What right does this case
implicate?,” “What government interest does this law serve?,” “What
injury has plaintiff suffered?,” and so forth. In answering an evaluative
question, we at least have the luxury of knowing that the answer must
come out one way or the other: either the characterized input will
satisfy the relevant criterion or it will not, and there is no other option
to choose. But to answer a characterization-based question, we must
begin from the vast universe of descriptively accurate labels that we
might affix onto a given body of facts. Worse yet, whereas the two
possible answers to an evaluative question are mutually exclusive of
one another—a right cannot be both fundamental and nonfundamental
at the same time— the much higher number of possible answers to
characterization questions are less obviously so. Descriptively
speaking, for instance, a substantive due process case can
simultaneously implicate a “right to same-sex marriage” and a “right
to marriage,” just as a qualified immunity case can simultaneously
implicate the “prohibition on abridgments of free speech” and the
“prohibition on abridgments of employee speech on matters of public
concern.” That is not to say that questions of evaluation are always
easier to answer than their characterization-based counterparts. But it
is to say that, all else equal, evaluation-based questions at least enjoy a
clarity of framing that their characterization-based counterparts do
not.
To be sure, distinguishing between characterization-based

34. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera
Beach, Florida, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 405 (noting that “legal decision making, in its archetypal
mode, is bivalent”).
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questions and evaluation-based questions may not always prove to be
a useful or easy exercise.35 Even so, and as I hope the ensuing
discussion will reveal, the distinction will often provide helpful means
of thinking about a range of different problems in a range of different
doctrinal contexts.
II. CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
This Part offers a representative but by no means exhaustive
catalogue of characterization choices implicated by constitutional
decision rules. Specifically, it highlights decisions in which the Supreme
Court has relied on a contestable characterization of the facts on the
way to determining the outcome of a given doctrinal test. Some of the
Court’s characterization choices, as we will see, are easier to spot than
others, but all of the examples below illustrate both the widespread
existence of characterization-based questions in constitutional doctrine
and the absence of a clear and systematic approach to resolving these
questions.36

35. In particular, it will sometimes be debatable whether a decision rule does in fact operate
on characterized inputs. Consider, for example, the much-debated question of whether the socalled “individual mandate” of the Affordable Care Act regulated “inactivity” or “activity”—a
question that five Justices ultimately found relevant to their disposition of the Commerce Clause
claim presented in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 522 (2013). Assuming for the moment the
validity of a rule that withholds from Congress the power to regulate “inactivity” under the
Commerce Clause, we might well disagree as to whether the application of that rule requires a
characterization of the facts. As this Article argues below, one might answer this question in the
affirmative, interpreting the rule the require the reviewing court to characterize out of the facts a
particular “behavior” regulated by the law, and then to evaluate the active or inactive nature of
the “behavior” so characterized. For a description of the question in these terms, see infra Part
II.D. But one might alternatively understand the determination in characterization-free terms;
perhaps, for instance, the operative decision rule simply instructs the court to ask whether a
challenged statute is or is not behavior-forcing, in which case a characterization of the regulated
behavior might not in fact be warranted. The ambiguity, in short, stems from the Court’s failure
to specify what exactly it understood the input of the operative decision rule to be: either the input
is the statute itself, or the input is the behavior regulated by the statute (which does require a
characterization choice). In this way can the seemingly straightforward distinction between
decision rules that do and do not require characterization choices tend to break down at the
margins.
36. This Part will also reveal that the Court itself often blends together its characterizationbased findings with its evaluation-based determinations. For example, rather than characterize
the relevant right whose fundamentality must be evaluated and then explain why that right does
or does not qualify as fundamental, the Court will sometimes simply catalogue reasons as to why
a case does or does not implicate a fundamental right without ever specifying what exactly it
understood that fundamental right to be. In other words, courts will often determine and justify
the outcome of a decision rule while failing to identify the precise contours of the particular input
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A. Characterizing Rights
Characterization problems frequently arise when litigants allege
infringements of unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Clause has long been
understood to contain a substantive component,37 according to which
courts must apply heightened scrutiny to government action that
deprives individuals of a fundamental right. The fundamentality or
nonfundamentality of the right asserted thus carries major implications
for the success or failure of a substantive due process claim, and courts
must, and often do, devote substantial analysis to the question of
whether the asserted right does or does not qualify as fundamental. But
a Court cannot render this assessment until it has rendered a
characterization of the relevant “right” to be assessed. Substantive due
process analysis therefore must begin, as the Court itself has
acknowledged, with a “‘careful description’ of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.”38
This is no easy task. A well-known illustration of its difficulties
comes from Michael H. v. Gerald D.39 Michael H. believed, on the basis
of strong DNA evidence, that he was the father of a child born to a
woman married to another man.40 A California court had denied his
request for visitation rights, citing to a state evidentiary presumption
they have evaluated.
To the extent this is so, it might provide reason to question the descriptive validity of an
adjudicatory model that conceptualizes “characterization” and “evaluation” as independent,
sequential steps. Certainly, it is important not to take the model as an airtight description of how
courts actually apply law to fact. Even so, the model still accords with descriptive reality insofar
as it describes what the operative decision rules themselves purport to require. When we are told
to evaluate the Y-ness of X, we cannot perform that task without first determining what X is, and
that fact is in and of itself descriptively significant. There can be a difference, in other words,
between what a decision rule instructs courts to do and what courts say they are doing when
applying that rule, but misalignments between these two things do not in any way falsify our
claims we might make about the rules themselves. To be sure, those misalignments may
themselves be significant. They might suggest, for instance, that courts are making the required
characterization choices internally, implicitly, or altogether subconsciously. They might also
suggest that a nominally operative decision rule is in fact inoperative, failing to guide or constrain
judicial decisionmaking as it purports to do. But those conclusions cast no doubt on the more
basic descriptive suggestion that I wish to offer here—namely, that many existing rules of
constitutional doctrine on their own terms require courts to engage in the difficult business of
characterizing inputs out of the facts.
37. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
38. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993)).
39. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
40. Id. at 113–14 (plurality opinion).
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that “the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband . . . is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.”41 In response,
Michael H. sought judicial invalidation of the presumption on
substantive due process grounds, claiming an unjustified government
infringement of a fundamental right.42 A fractured Court denied his
claim, with the Justices disagreeing about, among other things, how to
characterize the liberty interest Michael H. sought to vindicate.43
According to Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, Michael H. had invoked
an interest in “assert[ing] parental rights over a child born into a
woman’s existing marriage with another man”44—an interest that was
not “so deeply embedded within our traditions as to be a fundamental
right.”45 Justice Brennan and the other dissenters disagreed, arguing
that Michael H. was seeking recognition of the “parent-child
relationship”—an interest that “was among the first that this Court
acknowledged in its cases defining the ‘liberty’ protected by the
Constitution.”46 One group of Justices, in other words, saw the case as
concerning the rights of “adulterous natural father[s],”47 whereas
another group of Justices saw the case as concerning the right of
“parenthood,” full stop.48 With these differing characterizations
adopted, the Justices reached differing conclusions as to whether
Michael H. should win.
Characterization choices also played a significant role in shaping
the Court’s evaluation of state antisodomy laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court originally upheld one such law, reasoning in
Bowers v. Hardwick49 that the “right to engage in homosexual sodomy”
did not qualify as sufficiently fundamental to implicate heightened due
process protections.50 But some twenty years later, the Court reversed

41. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West 1989)).
42. Id. at 116.
43. Id. at 121–31 (plurality opinion); see id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); id. at
133 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 125 (plurality opinion).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting) (“Prior cases
here have recognized the liberty interest of a father in his relationship with his child.”).
47. Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion).
48. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
50. Id. at 191; see id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring) (“I write separately to underscore my
view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit
homosexual sodomy.”). But see id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The case before us
implicates both the decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to privacy.”).
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course in Lawrence v. Texas,51 finding in Bowers a “failure to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”52 Rather than implicate
the “right to engage in consensual sodomy,” the Court instead
characterized the right as involving “the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”53 Put
differently, the plaintiffs in Lawrence sought not just to engage in a
particular form of sexual activity, but rather to develop a “personal
bond that is more enduring.”54 The Court in Lawrence concluded that
its earlier decision in Bowers had thus “misapprehended the claim of
liberty there presented to it.”55
Consider also the Court’s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg—
described in this Article’s Introduction. A group of doctors and
patients sought facial invalidation of a Washington law prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide of terminally ill patients.56 Among the first
issues the Court confronted was the nature of the liberty interest at
stake: was it a “right to die,”57 a “liberty to choose how to die,”58 a right
to “control of one’s final days,”59 a “right to choose a humane, dignified
death,”60 or something else entirely? Confronting this question, and
emphasizing the Court’s “tradition of carefully formulating the interest
at stake in substantive due-process cases,”61 the Court ultimately
settled upon a formulation based on the “right to commit suicide which
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”62 Having framed the
right in these terms, the Court then proceeded to note that “[t]he

51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003).
52. Id. at 567. To be sure, the Court in Lawrence was not altogether clear as to whether the
(recharacterized) “liberty interest” did in fact qualify as fundamental. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting the absence of an explicit declaration as to the asserted right’s
fundamentality). But even though the Court never expressly declared that the plaintiff’s liberty
interests were fundamental, it left strong signals that suggested as much. See Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1893, 1935 (2004) (“The Court left no doubt about its understanding of the fundamental claim to
‘liberty’ being advanced in Lawrence . . . .”).
53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707–08 (1997).
57. Id. at 709 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc)).
58. Id. at 722 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 7, Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110)).
59. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 7, Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110)).
60. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 15, Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 723.
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history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this country has
been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to
permit it.”63 And that fact in turn led to the conclusion “that the
asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”64
Contested characterizations of rights recently took center stage in
litigation concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.65
Faced with the question whether the Due Process Clause prohibited
states from denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, lower court
judges had reached different results predicated on differing
characterizations of the right that same-sex marriage bans abridged.
Some judges in particular had characterized the relevant right as a
“right to same-sex marriage,” and they had further concluded that this
was not a right whose “fundamentality” could be demonstrated.66
Other judges, by contrast, characterized the right as a “right to
marry,”67 whose fundamentality was made manifest by prior Supreme
Court decisions such as Loving v. Virginia,68 Turner v. Safley,69 and
Zablocki v. Redhail.70 When the issue reached the Supreme Court, a
majority of the Justices opted for the broader of the two
characterizations, explaining the choice as follows:
[The respondents] assert the petitioners do not seek to exercise the
right to marry but rather a new and nonexistent “right to same-sex
marriage.” Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process
Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central
reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may
have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved
(physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this
Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including
marriage and intimacy. Loving did not ask about a “right to

63. Id. at 728.
64. Id.
65. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discussing competing
characterizations of the right to same-sex marriage).
66. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Loving addressed, and
rightly corrected, an unconstitutional eligibility requirement for marriage; it did not create a new
definition of marriage.”).
67. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Because we conclude that
the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage, Glucksberg’s analysis
is inapplicable here.”).
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
70. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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interracial marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to
marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid
child support duties to marry.” Rather, each case inquired about the
right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.
That principle applies here.71

The Obergefell dissenters, by contrast, saw things differently. In
their view, the “‘right to marry’ cases stand for the important but
limited proposition that particular restrictions on access to marriage as
traditionally defined violate due process.”72 The relevant case law, in
other words, “sa[id] nothing at all about a right to make a State change
its definition of marriage, which is the right that petitioners actually
seek here.”73 That being so, the right the plaintiffs sought—namely, a
right “to make a State change its definition of marriage”—could not be
shown to be fundamental within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause.74
In one sense, this dispute went to the import of prior precedents:
the Justices in the Obergefell majority saw the Court’s past “right to
marriage” cases as enshrining a broader set of constitutional
protections than did their colleagues in dissent. In another important
sense, however, the Justices’ dispute stemmed from differing
characterizations of the facts before them in terms of the right the
plaintiffs had invoked. Both camps in Obergefell could agree, and in
fact did agree, that Loving, Turner, and Zablocki established a
fundamental right to marry, but they could not agree on whether that
was the right at issue in Obergefell itself. Each side, looking at the same
set of facts, characterized out of those facts substantially different
descriptions of the liberty interest being asserted. And with these
divergent characterizations of the liberty interest on the table,
divergent conclusions as to its fundamentality naturally followed suit.
B. Characterizing Rules
Characterization problems can also arise within the law of
qualified immunity, which generally shields public officials from
71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (first citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
752–73 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); then citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789–92
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)).
72. Id. at 2619 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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liability for actions that, though unlawful, did not at the time of their
occurrence violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”75 The
standard exists to measure the “objective legal reasonableness” of
official conduct, which is to be “assessed in light of the legal rules that
were clearly established at the time it was taken.”76 This rule’s
applicability, as the Court has noted, “depends substantially upon the
level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.”77
The broader the characterization of the violated rule, the easier it is to
demonstrate a violation of clearly established law; the narrower the
characterization, the more difficult it becomes to do the same.78
Consequently, characterization choices regarding the identity of the
rule that an official is alleged to have violated can play a major role in
shaping courts’ dispositions of qualified immunity cases.
Consider Mullenix v. Luna.79 During the course of a car chase, a
Texas state trooper fatally shot the driver of a car.80 The district court
denied summary judgment to the trooper, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, with both courts finding that material issues of fact existed as
to the question whether the officer’s actions violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment law.81 Operative Fourth Amendment
doctrine, the Fifth Circuit explained, held in no uncertain terms that
“the use of deadly force, absent a sufficiently substantial and
immediate threat, violated the Fourth Amendment.”82 The plaintiffs
had adduced facts suggesting that the victim’s conduct had not given
rise to a “substantial and immediate” threat, the court reasoned,

75. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It bears noting that the qualified immunity
rule is not a “constitutional” rule, as it does not derive directly from the Constitution itself. See
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974) (describing qualified immunity as a “creature of the
common law”). But because the rule remains relevant to a wide variety of different constitutional
cases, I have chosen to include it within the scope of my analysis here.
76. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
614 (1999)).
77. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
78. See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 200
(1993) (“In most cases, the answer to the question of whether the right was clearly established
will be a function of how narrowly the ‘contours’ of the particular right are drawn when framing
the inquiry.”).
79. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
80. Id. at 306−07.
81. See id. at 307 (“[T]here are genuine issues of fact as to whether Trooper Mullenix acted
recklessly, or acted as a reasonable, trained peace officer would have acted in the same or similar
circumstances.” (quoting Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 725 (5th Cir. 2014))).
82. Luna, 773 F.3d at 725.
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meaning that the officer violated the clearly established Fourth
Amendment rule that “it is unreasonable for a police officer to use
deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient
threat of harm.”83
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not necessarily disagree with
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment clearly
prohibited the use of deadly force in the absence of a “substantial and
immediate threat,” nor did it necessarily disagree with the Fifth
Circuit’s conclusion that the officer had in fact exercised deadly force
in the absence of a substantial threat.84 But it did disagree with the
lower courts’ conclusion that the relevant rule implicated by the facts
was a general Fourth Amendment prohibition on the use of deadly
force in nonthreatening situations.85 Instead, the Court held that the
relevant rule should have been characterized with greater particularity,
incorporating into its content the specific circumstances faced by the
defendant when choosing to fire his weapon.86 With the rule so
characterized, its clearly established nature could hardly be shown,
given that past case law had “not clearly established that deadly force
is inappropriate in response to conduct like [the victim’s].”87 In other
words, it may have been true that Fourth Amendment doctrine plainly
prohibited the exercise of deadly force in the absence of a substantial
threat, but Fourth Amendment doctrine did not plainly prohibit the
exercise of deadly force under the circumstances the defendant faced.
Thus, the differing conclusions of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme
Court in Mullenix derived largely from differing characterizations of
the relevant rule whose clearly established nature was at issue in the
case.88
83. Id. (quoting Lytle v. Bexar Cty., 560 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)).
84. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 309 (“The relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion that
Mullenix acted unreasonably in these circumstances ‘beyond debate.’ The general principle that
deadly force requires a sufficient threat hardly settles this matter.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011))).
87. Id. at 311.
88. Disputes over the proper characterization of federal rules are not unique to qualified
immunity determinations. Similar issues have arisen in the context of federal collateral review,
where various procedural and remedial standards require federal courts to investigate the clarity
of the rule underlying a petitioner’s claim for postconviction relief. In Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S.
227 (1990), for instance, the Court confronted a retroactivity question stemming from a habeas
petitioner’s Eighth Amendment challenge to a capital sentence. Id. at 232. During sentencing
proceedings, the prosecutor had told the jury that its sentencing determination would represent
only an “initial step” in the sentencing process and that a juror voting for death should not “feel
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C. Characterizing Government Interests
Equal protection doctrine, substantive due process doctrine, free
speech doctrine, and various other areas of law often call upon courts
to employ some form of means/ends analysis in assessing the validity
of challenged government action.89 The requisite doctrinal standards
vary—the strict scrutiny test requires that the government interest be
“compelling” and that the challenged action be “narrowly tailored” to
that interest; the intermediate scrutiny test requires that the interest be
“important” and that the challenged action be “substantially tailored”
to that interest; the rational basis test requires that the interest be
merely “legitimate” and that the challenged action be “rationally
related” to that interest—but the overarching structure of the inquiry
is largely the same. In particular, all forms of means/ends analysis
require at their outset a characterization of the relevant government
interest whose importance and relatedness to the challenged law may

like you are the one . . . pulling the switch.” Id. at 231. The jury imposed the death sentence, and
the sentence was upheld on direct appeal. Id. at 232.
The retroactivity issue in Sawyer centered on a case called Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985), decided approximately one year after Sawyer’s conviction had become final. Caldwell,
according to the Court in Sawyer, had held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition
of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere,” Sawyer, 497
U.S. at 233 (citing Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328−29); Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and its holding therefore cast doubt on the
validity of Sawyer’s capital sentence. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233−34. But because Caldwell postdated
Sawyer’s conviction, Sawyer could not receive the benefit of Caldwell itself; rather, he needed to
show that Caldwell’s holding (and thus the unconstitutionality of his sentence) had been “dictated
by” prior precedents in existence at the time of his conviction. Id. at 234 (quoting Teague v. Lane,
498 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Whether that was so, however, depended
largely on how one chose to characterize the relevant rule that the prosecutor allegedly violated
in Sawyer’s case. Sawyer (and, ultimately, the dissenting Justices) sought to characterize the
prosecutor’s conduct as subverting the “principle of reliability in capital sentencing,” a principle
that long predated the decision in Caldwell itself. Id. at 247 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But a
majority of Justices rejected that characterization, believing it to be cast at too high a “level of
generality.” Id. at 236 (majority opinion). To these Justices, the relevant rule that the prosecutor
had violated was the holding of Caldwell itself—a prohibition on forms of “prosecutorial
comment” that diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility for imposing a sentence of death. Id.
And with the relevant characterization thus adopted, the majority could easily conclude that
Sawyer’s claim for relief was Teague-barred. Cases prior to Caldwell may have emphasized the
importance of reliability in capital sentencing, but “no case prior to Caldwell invalidated a
prosecutorial argument as impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, Sawyer’s claim for relief depended squarely on Caldwell and not its predecessor cases,
which in turn meant that Sawyer’s habeas petition relied on a rule that was “new.”
89. For a general overview of the various contexts in which this test arises, see Michael
Coenen, More Restrictive Alternatives, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19–41.
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then be assessed.90 In other words, to know whether a law is sufficiently
related to the achievement of a sufficiently important government
interest, courts first must characterize out of the facts the particular
government interest to be evaluated.
Despite the frequency with which the Court engages in
means/ends inquiries of this sort, it seldom explains the
characterization choices it makes regarding the relevant government
interest at stake. Much more often, the Court simply states without
explanation the interest that it understands a law to serve, and then
investigates with far more thoroughness the question of how that
government interest fares under the requisite means/ends criteria.91
This is a problem, because, as various commentators have suggested,
many government actions lend themselves to a host of different
interest-based characterizations, and these different characterizations
may carry different implications for the overall outcome of the
means/ends test.92 In other words, means/ends analysis may be sensitive
to threshold characterization choices that the Court seldom if ever
explains.
Richard Fallon has persuasively demonstrated this point by
reference to the question whether public universities violate the Equal
Protection Clause by considering race as a factor in student
admissions.93 Operative Supreme Court doctrine provides that such
programs should pass muster only if narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. To apply that test, we must know
something about what sorts of interest do and do not qualify as
compelling and we must have some general sense of how close the
means/ends fit must be to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement as
90. See Fox, supra note 6, at 274 (“The Constitution imparts no inventory of . . . interests that
the state may or must pursue, and a particular such interest can be described in any number of
ways. Courts therefore face a choice about how to characterize the interest(s) that a contested
state action advances.”).
91. See, e.g. Fallon, supra note 6, at 1321 (noting the Court’s “astonishingly casual” approach
to the question).
92. See, e.g., id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23,
at 983 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that the Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
adopted a “generous definition of a governmental purpose,” which “guaranteed that the law
under review would indeed be the ‘least restrictive means’ to the end being pursued”); Thomas
C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 40−41 (1994) (noting that “[m]any social goals appear
‘compelling’ when they are inflated to the highest level of generality” and that “too many free
exercise decisions have blindly accepted the government’s characterization of its interest at the
highest level of generality”).
93. Fallon, supra note 6, at 1323−24.
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well. But before even getting to these questions, we must settle on a
characterization of the relevant government interest underlying the
program under review. And this characterization choice is by no means
an easy one to make. As Fallon suggests, even once we have narrowed
our focus to matters of educational diversity, the range of plausible
characterization choices remains quite wide:
Is [the relevant interest] an interest in racial diversity or, instead, an
interest in diversity of perspectives for which racial background may
function as evidence, but evidence of only limited weight? A further
complication arises if it would be possible for a university to achieve
diversity without affirmative action if, for example, it reduced its
reliance on grades and test scores as admissions criteria. Is the
government’s compelling interest one that embraces both retaining
high academic distinction and achieving diversity? Finally, because
diversity is inherently a matter of degree, the question emerges
whether the government’s interest should be defined as one in
achieving diversity per se, or whether, instead, it should be regarded
as one in attaining particular levels or increments of diversity? In
other words, is there a compelling interest in moving from one level
of diversity (that is more than zero) to another, higher level?94

Our choice among these varying characterizations of the relevant
government interest may in turn affect our conclusions about its overall
weightiness and closeness of fit to whatever set of admissions criteria
the challenged program employs. In this way, Fallon argues, “it will
frequently be crucial how the government’s interest is defined.”95
To take another example, consider the Supreme Court’s recent
opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.96 There, the Court
rejected a First Amendment challenge to the federal “material
support” statute, considering in particular the statute’s application to
aid organizations seeking to “facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent
purposes” of various foreign groups the State Department had
designated as terrorist organizations.97 The challengers successfully
persuaded the Court to apply a heightened form of means/ends
analysis in evaluating the law’s application to them. But the Court
ultimately found the ban to be justified in light of a governmental
“objective of the highest order”—namely, “the Government’s interest

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1324 (footnotes omitted) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
Id. at 1323.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
Id. at 8−9.
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in combatting terrorism.”98 And while the Court devoted a significant
amount of attention to the question of why the law proved necessary
to the achievement of this interest,99 it devoted no attention whatsoever
to the question of why the interest should have been characterized in
this way. The relevant interest, after all, might alternatively have been
characterized as that of “undermining the operations of foreign
organizations designated as terrorist groups,” “prohibiting outside
assistance to such organizations,” “cutting off support for the lawful,
nonviolent activities of such organizations,” or “cutting off the
plaintiffs’ support for the lawful nonviolent activities of such
organizations,” and these alternative interests might not have qualified
as weighty enough to justify the infringement of speech that the
plaintiffs endured. And yet, the Court offered no explanation as to why
its preferred characterization of the government interest was in fact the
most appropriate.
D. Characterizing Activities
Characterization problems have also emerged in cases concerning
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. According to the
Court’s holdings in United States v. Lopez100 and United States v.
Morrison,101 Congress may regulate “economic” activities, which, when
taken in the aggregate, have a “substantial effect[]” on interstate
commerce.102 Whether a congressional enactment is consistent with the
Commerce Clause will thus depend, at least in part, on “whether an
intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial” in nature.103 This
question is difficult enough to answer on its own terms, but it becomes
even more vexing when one realizes that it will not always be clear how
to characterize the activity whose economic or noneconomic nature
must be determined.104
98. Id. at 28−29.
99. Id. at 27−40.
100. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
101. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
102. See id. at 611 (“[I]n those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Where economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained.”).
103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
104. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 904 (2005) (noting that “the ‘substantial effects’ test
depends on two utterly subjective judgments,” one of which “concerns the level of generality at
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Consider the facts of Lopez itself. The Gun Free School Zones
Act criminalized the possession of firearms in a school zone. In the
view of the Lopez majority, the regulated activity was obviously
noncommercial, for the simple reason that “[t]he possession of a gun
in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity.”105 But to the
dissenters, that conclusion was not so straightforward. The majority,
according to the dissent, “clearly cannot intend . . . to focus narrowly
on an act of gun possession standing by itself,” because the Court had
in prior cases allowed Congress to regulate “specific transaction[s]”
that were not in and of themselves commercial.106 At the same time, “if
the majority instead mean[t] to distinguish generally among broad
categories of activities,” its conclusions regarding the noncommercial
nature of the regulated activity would have become much harder to
defend.107 The relevant activity, after all, could alternatively have been
characterized as the “endangerment of school safety,” “the disruption
of educational services,” or perhaps even the “interference of
operations at a job-training facility,” and with the regulated activity
more broadly characterized, application of the commercial/
noncommercial distinction might have come out the other way.108 Gun
possession might not bear an important relationship to labor
productivity, but education certainly does. And if the law had been
characterized as an education-focused measure, rather than gunrelated measure, then a different conclusion should have followed,
given that Congress “could rationally conclude that schools fall on the
commercial side of the line.”109
which the regulated activity is characterized”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee,
Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1252 (2003) (“The Supreme Court exercises a . . . political and judgmentladen power when it selects a single, constitutionally relevant ‘activity’ for purposes of its
Commerce Clause analysis.”).
105. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
106. Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 204 (“[I]f one defines the activity that narrowly,
then it is unclear how, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gets upheld. For there, one could
have defined the activity as ‘discriminating’ and then asked whether discriminating is ‘commercial
or not.’”).
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628−29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the majority instead means to
distinguish generally among broad categories of activities . . . then, as a practical matter, the line
becomes almost impossible to draw.”).
108. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1259 (noting that “[i]n Lopez, the Court could
have focused on the business aspects of education, the business of guns or even illegal guns,
defendant Lopez’s plan to sell a gun in the school, or the many ripple effects of school quality and
safety on economic vitality” (footnote omitted)).
109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To this point, the majority responded that
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Characterization-related disputes also arose in Gonzales v.
Raich.110 There the Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), brought by individuals
involved in the personal cultivation of medicinal marijuana.111
Distinguishing the case from Lopez and Morrison, Justice Stevens had
no trouble identifying a regulated activity that was economic in
nature.112 As he explained, “[t]he CSA is a statute that regulates the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which
there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the
intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a
rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that
product.”113 But to Justice O’Connor in dissent, the majority had
mischaracterized the activity implicated by the case, suggesting instead
that the inquiry should have focused on “[t]he homegrown cultivation
and personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes.”114 Thus did the Justices’ disagreement in Raich as to the
economic or noneconomic nature of the activity in question depend
upon understandings of what that activity was. The majority
characterized the relevant activity as the entire class of behavior
covered by the CSA (the “production, distribution, and consumption
of commodities”),115 whereas the dissenters saw it as the narrower
behavior in which the plaintiffs themselves had engaged (i.e., “[t]he

“depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.” Id. at 565
(majority opinion). And Justice Breyer’s rationale therefore “lack[ed] any real limits,” because
similarly general characterizations could always be used to sustain any enactment along similar
lines. Id.
110. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
111. Id. at 6, 9.
112. Id. at 25 (“Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the
CSA are quintessentially economic.”).
113. Id. at 26; see also Michael C. Dorf, Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: Or Why the
Activity/Inactivity Distinction in the Health Care Case Was Really About the Right to Bodily
Integrity, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2013) (“[B]y defining the relevant activity in Raich as
the consumption of marijuana, the Court was able to analogize the case closely to [Wickard
v.Filburn], where the law aimed to limit the consumption of home-grown wheat by people like
Filburn.”).
114. Raich, 545 U.S. at 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Pushaw, supra note 104, at 904
(noting that “Justice O’Connor characterized the relevant activity narrowly” whereas Justice
Stevens “described the CSA broadly as governing the production, possession, and use of drugs”);
Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23 (“The characterization problem in Raich was
reminiscent of the classic ‘level of generality’ problem arising in the definition of fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause.”).
115. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18, 26.
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homegrown cultivation and personal possession and use of marijuana
for medicinal purposes”).116 And these different characterizations of
the relevant activity each supported their own respective conclusions
as to its economic or noneconomic nature.
Activity-based characterization choices have also accompanied
applications of the federalism canon of statutory construction, which
instructs courts to disfavor readings of congressional statutes that
would authorize action at “the outer limits of Congress’ power.”117 In
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers,118 the Corps claimed regulatory authority over a
landfill project that threatened the habitats of several species of
migratory birds, citing to Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act.
In the course of rejecting the Corps’ claim of statutory authority, the
Court pointed to the “serious constitutional problems” that might
result from construing the statute in the Corps’ favor.119 These
problems would arise, the Court explained, because “[p]ermitting [the
Corps] to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling
within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a significant
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land
and water use.”120 That argument, however, rested on a contestable
characterization of the activity that the Corps sought to regulate. If one
characterized the relevant activity as “land and water use,” then one
could make a case that the Corps was attempting to transgress a subject
of traditional state regulation. But why not alternatively characterize
the relevant activity as, say, the “endangerment of migratory birds,”
the “destruction of [an] aquatic migratory bird habitat,”121 the
“discharge of fill material into water,” or some other form of

116. Id. at 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 68 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“By
defining the class [of activities] at a high level of generality (as the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana), the majority overlooks that individuals authorized by state law to
manufacture and possess medical marijuana exert no demonstrable effect on the interstate drug
market.”).
117. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172, 174 (2001)
(“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power,
we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”).
118. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
119. Id. at 173.
120. Id. at 174.
121. Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The destruction of [an] aquatic migratory bird
habitat, like so many other environmental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a new
landfill) are disproportionately local, while many of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) are
widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other States.”).
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interference with traditionally federal regulatory interests? Whether
one saw a federalism problem in Solid Waste, in other words, depended
on how one chose to characterize the activity being regulated.122
Consider finally the five-Justice determination in NFIB v.
Sebelius123 that the Commerce Clause did not authorize enactment of
the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate.”124 In contrast to
Lopez, which turned on the noneconomic nature of the activity under
regulation, the commerce-power issue in NFIB turned on the question
of whether the individual mandate regulated “activity” as opposed to
“inactivity.”125 NFIB thus posed an interesting variation on the
characterization choice that the Court had earlier confronted: rather
than identify an activity whose economic or noneconomic nature would
then be decided, the Justices had to identify a relevant form of behavior
governed by the law, and then decide whether that behavior qualified
as any sort of activity at all. Five Justices opted for the “inactivity”
conclusion, with Chief Justice Roberts reasoning that the mandate
simply “compels individuals to become active in commerce by
purchasing a product,”126 and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito reasoning that the mandate “impressed into service third
parties.”127 But to the remaining Justices, it was hardly self-evident that
the relevant behavior should be characterized as the inactive
nonpurchase of health insurance. After all, they pointed out, “it is
possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with the
same effect,”128 and the nonpurchase of health could therefore easily

122. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1260 (calling Solid Waste “troubling because
of the Court’s insistence on interpreting the case and the Clean Water Act as involving land use
regulation, a function it characterized as ‘traditionally performed by local governments,’ rather
than as an example of federal environmental leadership in pollution control, protection of
biodiversity, or wildlife regulation.” (footnote omitted)).
123. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
124. See id. at 547−58 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The individual mandate forces individuals
into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law
cannot be sustained under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”); id. at 649−60
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“If this provision ‘regulates’ anything, it is the
failure to maintain minimum essential coverage . . . . [T]hat failure . . . is not ‘Commerce.’”).
125. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act,
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 19 (“A central theme of the majority’s opinions in NFIB was that the
mandate was unconstitutional because it regulated inactivity, rather than activity.”).
126. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 552 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
127. Id. at 652 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
128. Id. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc)).
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be recharacterized as an active “decision to self-insure.”129 To be sure,
the question of how to characterize the regulated behavior represented
only one of many points of disagreement among the Justices in NFIB.
But with respect to the particular issue of whether the mandate
regulated activity or inactivity, the Justices’ disagreement stemmed
largely from competing characterizations of the behavior that the
mandate targeted.
E. Characterizing Injuries
Modern Article III standing doctrine requires a would-be plaintiff
to demonstrate the existence of an injury-in-fact that is both fairly
traceable to a defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and redressable
by the courts.130 All three components of the test have generated
uncertainty: courts frequently disagree as to whether a claimed injury
is sufficiently concrete, whether the causal link between the injury and
the claimed unlawful conduct is sufficiently direct, and whether a
favorable judgment would be sufficiently ameliorative of the injury in
question. These disagreements stem in part from competing
conceptions of each component’s underlying requirements: How
actual, particularized, and imminent must a claimed injury be to satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement? How does one measure the causal link
between the injury and the challenged activity for purposes of the
fairly-traceable requirement? How substantially must judicial relief
alleviate the injury for purposes of the redressability requirement? But
lurking beneath these disputes are important questions of
characterization as well. Simply put, whether or not a claimed injury
meets the Article III standard will sometimes depend on what that
injury is understood to be.131
Consider, for instance, Professor Gene Nichol’s discussion of the
standing determinations in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,132 Warth v.
Seldin,133 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

129. Id. at 615; see also id. at 612 (“An individual who opts not to purchase insurance from a
private insurer can be seen as actively selecting another form of insurance: self-insurance.”).
130. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (setting out the elements of
standing).
131. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1464 (1988) (noting that the “central problem” in many standing “cases is not whether
there is a causal nexus among injury, remedy, and illegality; it is how to characterize the relevant
injury”).
132. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
133. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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Organization134—three cases in which the plaintiffs alleged an injury
based on their difficulties in obtaining access to a service or good.135 In
Linda R.S., the plaintiffs challenged the discriminatory enforcement of
a state child support law, citing to the reduced availability of child
support assistance as their alleged injury-in-fact.136 In Warth, the
plaintiffs challenged a local government’s exclusionary zoning policy,
citing to the reduced availability of housing as their injury-in-fact.137
And in Simon, the plaintiffs challenged the provision of favorable tax
treatment to hospitals, citing to the reduced availability of medical
services as their alleged injury-in-fact.138 All three cases, in short,
involved plaintiffs seeking access to something and claiming that
unlawful government activity frustrated their ability to obtain it. And
all three cases foundered on causation/redressability grounds, with the
Court concluding that the relief being sought—even if issued—would
not do enough to alleviate the injuries in question.139
In one sense, these cases turned on the plaintiffs’ failure to
demonstrate that ceasing the allegedly unlawful behavior would
guarantee them access to the goods and services they sought: even with
the requested injunctions in place, the Linda R.S. plaintiffs might still
fail to obtain child support, the Warth plaintiffs might still fail to obtain
housing, and the Simon plaintiffs might still lack access to medical
services. But in another sense, their outcomes rested on contestable
characterizations of the injuries that prompted these plaintiffs to bring
suit. Nichol explains:
In Linda R.S., the Court refused jurisdiction because even a decree
requiring nondiscriminatory enforcement would not ensure support.
But why was obtaining the payment of child support considered the
relevant injury? The mother in Linda R.S. sought to be treated on an
equal basis with married mothers. Her injury—denial of equal
treatment—would undoubtedly have been redressed by an
affirmative decree requiring enforcement of child support obligations

134. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
135. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 79–82 (1984).
136. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 615–16.
137. Warth, 422 U.S. at 495–96.
138. Simon, 426 U.S. at 45.
139. See id. (“Speculative inferences are necessary to connect [the respondents’] injury to the
challenged actions of petitioners.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 506 (“[T]he record is devoid of any
indication . . . that, were the court to remove the obstructions attributable to respondents, such
relief would benefit petitioners.”); Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618 (“The prospect that prosecution
will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.”).
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against unmarried fathers. Similarly, the Warth plaintiffs sought not
only to obtain housing in Penfield. They also asserted their interest in
equal participation in a housing market not distorted by
unconstitutional zoning practices. The denial of a meaningful
opportunity to persuade others to construct low cost housing in
Penfield, for example, would have been redressed by a determination
that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The indigents in Simon had
no objection to receiving hospital access, but the interest they asserted
would more appropriately be described as having hospital decisions
concerning the services offered to indigents accurately reflect an
earlier incentive structure implicitly approved by the Congress.
Again, that injury would have been redressed by the claim
presented.140

And the puzzle becomes more puzzling when still other cases enter the
mix. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,141 the Court
found no causation or redressability-based bar to an applicant’s
challenge to a medical school’s affirmative action program.142 As in
Linda R.S., Warth, and Simon, the plaintiff in Bakke could not
definitively show that a favorable decision from a court would have
resulted in his obtaining the service that he sought—namely, an
education from the UC Davis Medical School. But that fact did not
matter, the Court held, because the relevant injury suffered by Alan
Bakke was simply his inability “to compete for all 100 places in the
class.”143 And that injury, by definition, could obviously be redressed
by a judicial order requiring that the school allow Bakke to compete
for all 100 places in the entering class. Bakke might not ultimately gain
admission to the program, but his injury had been characterized in a
way that rendered that fact irrelevant. Bakke’s “opportunity-based”
injury—namely, his inability to compete for class seats on a level
playing field with others—could thus be certainly remedied, whereas
the previous plaintiffs’ actuality-based injuries could not.144 The

140. Nichol, supra note 135, at 80 (footnote omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for
Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1356 (2000) (noting that “to
know whether the redressability requirements are met, it is necessary to know how to characterize
the relevant injury”).
141. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
142. Id. at 280–81 n.14.
143. Id.; see Nichol, supra note 135, at 81 (“If . . . the Warth plaintiffs could redress their
injuries only by showing that they would actually obtain housing, and if the mother in Linda R.S.
was required to show that she would actually receive support payments, Bakke should have been
made to prove that he would have gotten into medical school.”).
144. See Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam) (“Of course, a plaintiff who
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differences in outcomes therefore stemmed from antecedent
differences in characterization.
F. Characterizing Fields
Characterization problems also attend federal-law preemption
cases, especially those predicated on theories of implied rather than
express preemption. A common means of determining whether a
federal law impliedly preempts a state law is to ask whether the federal
law “occupies the field” in which the state law regulates.145 Field
preemption analysis requires courts to identify the regulatory field of
the allegedly preempted state law and to ask whether that same field
has already been occupied by the allegedly preemptive federal law.
Framed in this way, field preemption analysis often turns on how the
regulatory fields have been characterized. And this is a problem,
because “[i]n most cases, the relevant ‘field’ can be characterized in
multiple ways.”146
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission,147 utility companies
challenged a California moratorium on the construction of nuclear
power plants, claiming that the law was preempted by the federal
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).148 In the challengers’ view, the case
was straightforward: the AEA occupied the field of nuclear power
regulation, and the California moratorium—by restricting the
construction of nuclear power plants—had impermissibly encroached
upon that field.149 But the Court saw things differently. In its eyes, the
challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not
affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered.
The relevant injury in such cases is ‘the inability to compete on an equal footing.’” (quoting Ne.
Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666
(1993)); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 666 (“The ‘injury in
fact’ in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”).
145. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress occupies an
entire field . . . even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”).
146. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 336; see also Eang L. Ngov, Under Containment:
Preempting State Ebola Quarantine Regulations, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 34 (2015) (“[W]hether the
federal government successfully exerts field preemption depends on how narrowly or broadly the
field is defined.”).
147. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983).
148. Id. at 194–95.
149. Id. at 204.
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AEA reflected Congress’s desire that “the Federal Government
should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the
construction and operation of a nuclear plant,”150 whereas the
California moratorium reflected an attempt to deal with “economic
problems, not radiation hazards”151 associated with nuclear power.
Thus, by defining the respective fields of each law narrowly, the Court
was able to reach the conclusion that the fields did not in fact overlap.
Related problems emerge from the rule mandating a presumption
against implied preemption in cases involving “fields of traditional
state regulation.”152 Here, too, the characterizations of the relevant
field can matter a great deal, with some characterizations more
conducive than others to a finding that a federal law touches on a
traditional regulatory province of the state. Consider, for instance, the
Second Circuit’s recent decision in Liberty Mutual Insurance v.
Donegan,153 which presented the question whether the federal ERISA
statute preempted a Vermont law requiring health insurance
companies to submit to the state claims data “and other information
relating to health care.”154 Two judges on the panel found the
presumption inapplicable and the Vermont law not preempted,
reasoning that “state health data collection laws do not regulate the
safe and effective provision of health care services, which is among the
states’ historic police powers.”155 To the dissenting judge, however, the
picture looked quite different: The “stated purpose” of the Vermont
statute was to “help improve health care quality,” and the law certainly
“‘operate[d] in [the] field’ of health and safety.”156 Health care
information services may not have qualified as a traditional field of
state regulation, but “general health care regulation” clearly did so
qualify.157 And, thus, having characterized the relevant field in such
divergent fashions, the two sides of Donegan reached different
conclusions regarding the overall applicability of the presumption
150. Id. at 205.
151. Id. at 213.
152. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995).
153. Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom., Gobeille v.
Liberty Mut. Ins., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016).
154. Id. at 501.
155. Id. at 506 n.8; see also id. (noting that “collecting data can hardly be deemed ‘historic’—
most such laws were enacted only within the last ten years”).
156. Id. at 513 (Straub, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting De Buono v.
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997)).
157. Id. at 512.
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itself.
These and other preemption cases lend support to one
commentator’s recent observation that “[t]he doctrine of field
preemption gives the courts power to affect the federal-state balance
by choosing the level of generality at which to define the relevant
field.”158 When it comes to field preemption analysis, in other words,
characterizing the relevant field “becomes the entire game.”159
G. And on and on . . .
Further examples are not difficult to come by. In the First
Amendment context, for instance, various rules of free speech doctrine
direct attention to the question of whether a speaker’s message
involves a “matter of public concern”160—a test that requires judges to
characterize the matter about which a speaker spoke.161 In a variety of
doctrinal contexts, courts must ask whether multiple regulatory

158. Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1067 (2013)
[hereinafter Preemption].
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (requiring a showing of
actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against a private figure plaintiff in a
defamation action involving a matter of public concern); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) (confirming that the Gertz framework applies
only to expression on a “matter of . . . public concern”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968) (setting forth limited free-speech protections for public employees who have spoken
on “matters of public concern”).
161. In Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), for instance, the Court had to determine
whether a protest outside a military funeral dealt with a matter of “public concern.” The Justices’
disagreement on this question turned largely on differing characterizations of the “matter” that
the protesters addressed. Compare, e.g., id. at 454 (contending that the protesters, who charged
that a deceased soldier’s death represented divine retribution for various sins committed by the
U.S. government and the public at large, were speaking on “issues” such as “the political and
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy,” all of which qualified as “matters of public
import”), with id. at 470 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that the protesters were “specifically
attack[ing] Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United
States military,” and contending that “[w]hile commentary on the Catholic Church or the United
States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding Matthew
Snyder’s purely private conduct does not”). See also Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s
Lonely War Against Abhorrent, Low-Value Expression: A Malleable First Amendment
Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions of Morality and Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 173
(2011) (“Justice Alito also interpreted all of the signs, despite their seeming reference to larger
political issues, to be personal in reference and personal affronts to Matthew Snyder.”). Everyone
could agree, in other words, that “the political and moral conduct of the United States”
constituted a matter of public concern and that Matthew Snyder’s life did not constitute a matter
of public concern, but the Justices could not agree on which of the two topics counted as the
“matter” of relevance to the case.
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“purposes” satisfy an overarching germaneness requirement162—a test
that requires judges to characterize the relevant purposes whose
germaneness must be assessed.163 In the dormant Commerce Clause
context, courts must sometimes ask whether commercial regulations
serve a “traditional government function”164—a test that requires
judges to characterize the function whose traditional or nontraditional
nature is at stake.165 And I suspect that other examples could be found
162. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 941–46 (2006) (highlighting examples of
germaneness requirements within constitutional doctrine).
163. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), for instance, the Court
struck down a conditional land use permit as a violation of the Takings Clause, finding no
“essential nexus” between the regulatory purpose of the permit condition and the regulatory
purpose of the permitting regime itself. Id. at 837. To Justice Scalia and four other Justices, an
essential nexus was lacking: the purpose of the permit condition was to facilitate free public use
of the ocean, whereas the purpose of the permitting regime was to protect views of the coastline.
See id. at 838 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the
beach created by the new house.”). But alternative characterizations could have supported a
different result. Both components of the permitting scheme, for instance, could be said to pursue
the unitary goal of ensuring adequate public enjoyment of the beach, with the permitting
requirement facilitating the visual aspects of that enjoyment and the easement requirement
facilitating the physical aspects of that enjoyment. And if that degree of fit was not good enough,
one might instead have characterized the two requirements as jointly facilitating “responsible use
of land,” “the development of a public-friendly coastal community,” or simply “public welfare of
Californians.” See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 243 (1988) (“There was nothing in
the majority opinion which argued for adopting its characterization rather than California’s,
except that it spared the Court from openly admitting its use of heightened scrutiny.”); Jeremy
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1991) (“If the
California Coastal Commission were permitted broadly to describe its goal as promoting the best
use of state beaches and adjacent land, however, the Commission could easily argue that
restricting the building of private beachfront homes and demanding that members of the public
be permitted to walk across the beach served the same purpose.”).
164. United Haulers Ass’n Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
345 n.7 (2007); see also Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the
State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 594
(2010) (highlighting the Court’s reliance on a “traditional-government-function” test as a means
of determining whether certain types of flow-control ordinances pass constitutional muster).
165. In United Haulers, the Justices disagreed as to whether a local ordinance requiring the
processing of local waste at a government-owned “local transfer facility” served a traditional
government function, and this disagreement stemmed largely from differing characterizations of
the function that the facility served. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 357. To the majority, the
ordinance dealt with a “typical[] and traditional[] . . . local government function”—namely, the
problem of “waste disposal.” Id. at 344. But the dissenters saw things differently. As they put it,
“a ‘traditional’ municipal landfill is for present purposes entirely different from a monopolistic
landfill supported by the kind of discriminatory legislation . . . in this case,” given that the latter
sort of landfill “has been deemed unconstitutional until today.” Id. at 369–70 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). In sum, the majority understood the relevant governmental function in United
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as well.
The bottom line is this: input-characterization problems
frequently surface but only sometimes grab the judicial limelight. They
are influential but often unaddressed. That fact should give us pause.
If characterization choices really influence the outcomes of
constitutional cases as frequently as they appear to, then we need to
think seriously about where these choices come from and how they
should be made.
The next two Parts of this Article attempt to do just that. Each
does so from a different perspective. Part III first considers whether,
and if so how, constitutional decision rules might be designed so as to
avoid being influenced or manipulated by characterizations of their
inputs. As it turns out, this goal can be achieved in at least three
different ways—the problem, however, is that eliminating the influence
of characterization choices will likely come at the expense of significant
tradeoffs that will not always be worth making. That observation sets
the stage for Part IV, which works through various means by which
courts might develop principled approaches to rendering the
characterization choices that a given decision rule demands. Put
another way, we will first consider the possibility of avoiding
characterization problems by constructing decision rules that can resist
the influence of characterization choices, and we will next consider the
possibility of mitigating characterization problems through the
development of constraints on the characterization process.
III. CHARACTERIZATION-RESISTANT DOCTRINE?
We have seen that characterization problems arise when the
outcomes of legal tests depend on how we characterize the inputs that
go into those tests. This observation suggests that characterization
problems might be managed, or at least mitigated, at the level of
decision rule design. Rather than solve the problem of characterization
by articulating a coherent and principled approach to the making of
characterization choices, we might instead dissolve the problem by
formulating decision rules that avoid difficult and consequential

Haulers to be “the disposal of waste,” which in turn qualified as “traditional” under the test the
Court applied understood the relevant government function to be the operation of a
“monopolistic landfill,” which did not qualify as “traditional” within the framework of the same
doctrinal test. See also Coenen, supra note 164, at 594 (noting that application of the “traditionalgovernment-function” test can “depend on the level of generality at which the court characterizes
the relevant government activity”).
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characterization choices altogether.
This Part considers three potential approaches to avoiding
characterization problems through the strategic design of legal decision
rules. First, courts might formulate decision rules that operate on
objectively identifiable facts requiring little to no characterization of
their own. Second, courts might formulate decision rules that operate
on the entirety of a given fact pattern. And finally, courts might
formulate decision rules that, while requiring characterization choices
at the outset of the inquiry, are structured in such a way as to render
characterization choices relatively inconsequential to the overall
outcome of the case. As we will see, each of these options carries some
promise, but none provides a panacea.
A. Targeted Inputs
The decision rules we considered in Part II share the important
feature of requiring inputs of an abstract and ethereal nature. Concepts
such as activities, functions, injuries, interests, rights, and rules do not
define themselves, and their latent complexities therefore make it
difficult for courts to characterize particular instances of these concepts
in uniform and unambiguous terms. When courts must translate the
factual specifics of a case into the language of a capacious doctrinal
input, the capaciousness of the input often gives rise to a difficult
characterization choice. The concept of an “injury” is consistent with a
complaint about one’s failure to obtain a good, but it is also consistent
with a complaint about having to compete for that good on an unequal
basis.166 The concept of an “interest” is consistent with a highly detailed
and fact-specific regulatory objective, but it is also consistent with bigpicture objectives like “national security,” the “protection of children,”
and the “wellbeing of the nation.”167 The concept of an “activity” is
consistent with a description of a single individual’s conduct, but it is
also consistent with a description of the workings of an entire field of
business.168 Simply put, the fuzzier the doctrinal input, the wider the
range of different characterizations it can accommodate. And the
wider the range of potential characterizations, the harder it becomes to
choose one among the many possible characterizations that the facts
might make available.
An initial characterization-avoidance strategy would attempt to
166. See supra Part II.E.
167. See supra Part II.C.
168. See supra Part II.D.
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reduce the abstractness of the input itself by employing decision rules
that operate on targeted inputs drawn directly from the facts. Consider,
for example, the well-known rule of Miranda v. Arizona,169 which
requires investigators to apprise suspects of certain constitutional
protections before initiating a custodial interrogation.170 Most
applications of the Miranda rule require no abstract characterization
of the facts; one simply cross-references the statement made at the
beginning of the custodial interrogation against the mandatory
components of the Miranda warning and determines on the basis of
that comparison whether the rule has been satisfied. The relevant
input—the statements made to the defendant—can be lifted directly
out of the fact pattern of the case; the rule requires no characterization
of that input into a higher-level set of abstractions. The Miranda rule
thus turns out to be “easy-to-apply,” not just in the sense that it is
usually easy to determine whether a given communication satisfies its
bright-line requirements,171 but also in the sense that it is usually easy
to identify what that communication is.
Here is another example. The “actual malice” requirement of New
York Times v. Sullivan172 imposes special free-speech limits on the
ability of public figure plaintiffs to obtain defamation judgments.173 It
is not always easy to determine whether a given defamation plaintiff
qualifies as a public figure,174 but it is very easy to say who exactly that
defamation plaintiff is. To identify the relevant input of the public
figure decision rule, one usually need only consult the caption of the
case itself—the caption will tell us the identity of the defamation
plaintiff and thus, by extension, the identity of the relevant doctrinal
input. No additional characterization of the input is required: the
person is the person, and courts will therefore rarely, if ever, disagree
as to how to characterize the entity whose public or nonpublic status
will help to determine the case’s outcome. Thus, the New York Times
rule, like the Miranda rule, avoids characterization problems by calling
169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
170. Id. at 444.
171. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1350 (2005) (noting
that the Court in Miranda “put in place an overprotective, easy-to-apply rule”).
172. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
173. Id. at 283 (setting forth an “actual malice” rule applicable in cases involving “public
officials”); see also Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) (noting
that “public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard” (citing Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (plurality opinion))).
174. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (outlining criteria according to
which a plaintiff’s status as a “public” or “private” figure might be judged).
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for the evaluation of a concretized and specified input—an input that
emerges directly and uncontroversially from the fact pattern of a given
case.
Consider finally the Court’s suggestion in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance v. Campbell175 that the Due Process Clause
disfavors the awarding of punitive damages equal to or in excess of ten
times the amount of compensatory damages.176 Characterization
problems will not often accompany the determination of whether a
civil judgment satisfies this criterion.177 Rather, courts can simply
extract from the fact pattern two readily apparent numerical values
(the amount of punitive damages and the amount of compensatory
damages), calculate the ratio between those values, and then determine
whether that ratio is higher or lower than ten-to-one.
These decision rules all manage to avoid characterization
problems by homing in on objectively identifiable facts within the fact
pattern and rendering those facts at least partially dispositive of the
constitutional inquiry. Courts need not apply abstract descriptive
labels to factual information within the record; they instead need only
select out the particular fact or facts on which the rule’s applicability
depends. The mine-run Miranda claim does not require us to
characterize a transaction between suspects and police in terms of
“interests,” “liberties,” “activities,” and the like. It instead requires us
to look at the words exchanged prior to an interrogation to determine
whether those words communicated an adequate warning within the
meaning of the Miranda test. Similarly, the New York Times rule does
not require us to characterize a defendant’s allegedly defamatory
conduct in terms of a relevant “purpose,” “function,” or “subject
175. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
176. Id. at 425 (“[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
177. Characterization problems, to be sure, might still emerge when courts apply other
components of the State Farm test. The test also instructs courts to consider, for instance, how a
given damages award compares to “the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable misconduct.” See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996). And that prong
of the test appears to be somewhat characterization-dependent, at least insofar as it requires a
court to characterize the relevant “misconduct” in which a punitive damages defendant engaged.
Suppose for example, that a defendant kills a plaintiff when driving while drunk and that the
plaintiff’s estate collects a large punitive damages award. If we were to consider the validity of the
award by reference to the “comparable sanctions” prong of the State Farm test, we would need to
consider how the award aligns with other criminal and civil penalties that the state imposes on
similar misconduct. But to know what penalties to look at, we need to define the relevant
misconduct in this case—misconduct that could alternatively be characterized as drunk driving,
reckless driving, vehicular homicide, negligent homicide, homicide, and so forth.
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matter.” Rather, it simply requires us to single out one particular
variable within the fact pattern—namely, the plaintiff bringing the
defamation suit—and to evaluate that variable in terms of the criteria
that distinguish a public from a nonpublic figure. And, finally, while
other components of the State Farm rule may require us to characterize
facts in abstract-ified terms, the ratio presumption itself circumvents
this difficulty; the only input of importance to that particular test is a
numerical value that the facts can usually furnish in a straightforward
and unambiguous way.
These types of decision rules may well succeed at eliminating, or
at least mitigating, characterization problems within the cases that they
govern. But as with any effort to increase the predictability and
objectivity of the law, insisting that a given doctrinal test operate on
targeted facts rather than abstract characterizations of the facts
threatens to undermine the nuance, flexibility, and context sensitivity
of the doctrine writ large.178 We are dealing here with a variation on
the familiar tradeoff between rules and standards.179 When we single
out objectively verifiable facts as dispositive determinants of a test’s
application, we necessarily increase the rule-like—as opposed to
standard-like—nature of the test and thereby render that test more
likely to generate outcomes at odds with the substantive values of the
norm it purports to enforce.180 Within some areas of doctrine, that may
be a tradeoff worth making: a rule’s over- and underinclusiveness
problems may be mild enough to justify the gains realized in the way
of consistency, predictability, and ease of application. But within other
areas of doctrine, an emphasis on easily definable inputs will result in

178. This thought is consistent with Duncan Kennedy’s observation that “ruleness” of a
directive depends in part on its reference to “easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation.”
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687
(1976).
179. For an overview of the rules/standards debate (and for citations to key contributions to
the voluminous literature on the subject), see Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124
YALE L.J. 644, 652–53 (2014).
180. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest a one-to-one correspondence between “targetedinput” tests and bright-line rules. Some targeted-input tests will be more bright-line than others,
with each test’s overall level of nuance and context sensitivity dependent on the nature of the
evaluative criteria it employs. The New York Times test, for instance, probably qualifies as less
rule-like than the Miranda test, for the simple reason that determining whether a given person
qualifies as a public or nonpublic figure will usually be more difficult than determining whether a
given preinterrogation statement contains the requisite warnings. That said, I do believe that, all
else equal, targeted-input tests will tend to qualify as more rule-like than their abstract-input
counterparts.
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overwhelming problems of fit.181
Still, if courts are determined enough to avoid characterization
problems, the targeted-input strategy offers one potential means of
achieving their goal. One need not think hard to imagine bright-line
replacements for the characterization-dependent doctrines we
considered in the previous part. Qualified immunity could be
automatically available to defendants who prove to the fact finder that
their violation of the law occurred unknowingly.182 Commerce Clause
doctrine could validate any and all congressional enactments that
Congress proclaims to be justified by the commerce power (or, for that
matter, any and all enactments of Congress, period). Substantive due
process doctrine could stipulate that courts must always (and only) rule
in favor of claimants whose name begins with the letter “M.” And these
rules could certainly be applied in a manner that obviated the need to
characterize any set of facts in higher-level descriptive terms. The
trouble is that these rules, and many others like them, will give rise to
other serious problems that independently militate against their use. It
is, in other words, always theoretically possible to formulate
characterization-resistant decision rules that call for targeted

181. Indeed, even where rules prevail, characterization problems might still creep back into
the picture. Legal scholars have long noted that bright-line rules tend to lose their brightness over
time, with the sharp edges of categorical boundaries softened, blurred, and qualified so as to avoid
otherwise unseemly results. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 178, at 1701; Frederick Schauer, The
Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 804
(2005) (“From the American Legal Realists to the present, legal theorist[s] have devoted some
attention to the ways in which seemin[g]ly cri[sp] rules may have their edges rounded upon
application, interpretation, or enforcement.”). Thus, for instance, the Court has crafted a public
safety exception to the Miranda requirement, permitting officials to conduct warning-less
interrogations when they are “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.” See New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). Similarly, the Court has extended the protections of
the New York Times rule to protect not just public figure plaintiffs but also, in a more limited
fashion, private figure plaintiffs who have spoken on matters of public concern. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–51 (1974). And, of course, the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages must be assessed in connection with myriad other facts before any final
constitutional judgment can be rendered. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. Rarely is it the case that
the applicability of a constitutional norm depends entirely on a small number of precisely
identifiable facts; more often than not, multiple different aspects of a fact pattern will bear on the
overall inquiry in multiple different ways. Not surprisingly, the more complex and multifaceted
the inquiry becomes, the greater the risk that characterization problems will start to emerge.
182. Notice that this particular example would effectively trade out a difficult characterization
problem (the problem of characterizing the relevant law that the defendant violated) for a difficult
problem of fact identification (determining the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the
illegality of the actions undertaken). For a variety of reasons, this might not be a tradeoff worth
making. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–20 (1982) (identifying various downsides
associated with a “subjective” approach to qualified immunity determinations).
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assessments of a handful of isolated facts. But it is by no means easy to
formulate those rules in terms that promote the fair and effective
implementation of the norm they purport to enforce.
B. Holistic Inputs
We first considered the possibility of eliminating characterization
problems by singling out a fact pattern’s objectively definable features
as the guiding criteria for a decision rule’s application. But courts might
also avoid characterization problems by taking the opposite tack—
namely, by designing decision rules that operate on the entirety of a
given fact pattern rather than any particular facts within it. Call this the
“holistic input” strategy. The strategy eschews the specificity and
rigidity of the bright-line rule in favor of the fluidity and openendedness of the all-things-considered standard. These sorts of
decision rules avoid characterization problems by instructing courts to
evaluate all of the facts before them in their raw and uncharacterized
form.
In Rochin v. California,183 the Justices ruled in favor of a criminal
defendant whose conviction had resulted from an unauthorized entry
into his home and the forcible “pumping” of morphine capsules out of
his stomach.184 Notably, the Justices did not attempt to resolve the case
by asking whether the government had abridged a fundamental right,
and they thus circumvented the need to define with any precision the
nature of the relevant liberty interest that the government had
abridged.185 Instead, cutting straight to the heart of the matter, the
Court chose to carry out “an exercise of judgment upon the whole
course of the proceedings” so as to determine whether the state’s
conduct ran afoul of the basic “standards of justice” that the Due
Process Clause served to protect.186 And having articulated the inquiry
in these terms, the Court went on to apply it, concluding that
the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks

183. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
184. Id. at 165–66.
185. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time To Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L.
REV. 307, 318 n.64 (2010) (“In Rochin, the Court invoked the shocks the conscience test without
first identifying a fundamental right.”).
186. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (emphasis added) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
416–17 (1945)).
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the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner,
the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities.187

The Court in Rochin thus managed to evade characterization
choices by fashioning a decision rule—the “shocks-the-conscience”
test—that took as its input not a particular characterization of the facts,
but rather all of the facts presented by the case.188 The analysis involved
a holistic evaluation of the entire course of proceeding, and the test
thus obviated the need to formulate a single, generalized description of
any particular right that the government had abridged—and, for that
matter, any particular government interest that the abridgement might
have been said to further. The Justices simply surveyed all of the events
that took place in the days leading up to Rochin’s conviction and
rendered a judgment as to whether those events—however one might
choose to characterize them—provoked a conscience-shocking
reaction. Contestable characterizations of the facts played a minimal
role in shaping the Court’s analysis of the case.
The shocks-the-conscience test enjoys only a limited scope of
application today,189 but other analogous holistic-input tests are not
difficult to find within constitutional doctrine. For example, Fourth
Amendment doctrine provides that courts should apply the probable
cause standard according to an “all-things-considered approach,”190
187. Id. at 172.
188. Accord Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (noting, in connection with
an application of the shocks-the-conscience test, that “asserted denial [of due process] is to be
tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case” (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 462 (1942))).
189. Specifically, the Court has confined operation of the test to substantive due process
claims involving allegedly “abusive” forms of executive action, see Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (“[F]or
half a century now we have spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that
which shocks the conscience.”), while further specifying that the question should be considered
“antecedent to any question about the need for historical examples of enforcing a liberty interest
of the sort claimed.” Id. at 847 n.8; see also Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-theConscience Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 981, 993 (2000) (noting that “satisfaction of the shocks-the-conscience standard, as
employed in Lewis, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the maintenance of a
substantive due process challenge to executive action”). There remains, however, considerable
confusion and disagreement within the lower courts as to the precise scope and manner of the
test’s operation. See Levinson, supra note 185, at 320–34.
190. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (“In evaluating whether the State has met this
practical and common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the
circumstances.”).
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and that the general reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search or
seizure should be evaluated by reference to “all the circumstances”
accompanying its execution.191 Similarly, Sixth Amendment doctrine
provides that courts must “consider[] all the circumstances” in
determining whether an attorney’s representation qualifies as
constitutionally deficient.192 Due process rules governing suggestive
identification practices employ a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, “requir[ing] courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis,
whether improper police conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of
misidentification.’”193 Within these areas of the law, abstract
conceptual descriptions of the facts need not play a significant role in
the application of the operative doctrinal test.
In one sense, this holistic-input strategy poses an inverted version
of the tradeoff we considered in the previous Section. Whereas an
emphasis on targeted inputs threatens to render decision rules unduly
rigid and inflexible in application, an emphasis on holistic inputs might
render those same rules unduly amorphous and unpredictable, offering
too little in the way of ex ante guidance as to how a given decision rule
will apply in various cases.194 To the extent that courts seek some
measure of certainty and predictability in the operation of a given
doctrinal test, they might have reason to prefer a more structured, but
characterization-dependent decision rule over an unstructured,
holistic-input alternative. Perhaps, for instance, a fundamental rights
approach to substantive due process analysis is superior to a shocksthe-conscience approach for the simple reason that the former
constrains and focuses judicial engagement in a way that the latter does
not. If so, then characterization problems might be worth enduring for
the simple sake that the alternative characterization-resistant rule
leaves too much up in the air.195

191. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
192. Strickland v. Washington, 467 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“In any case presenting an
ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.”).
193. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 239 (2012) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
201 (1972)).
194. Cf. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2517 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that “th’ol’ totality-of-the-circumstances test” is “not a test at all but merely assertion
of an intent to perform test-free, ad hoc, case-by-case evaluation”).
195. There is another reason to worry about the constraining effect of a holistic-input decision
rule: the rule itself says nothing about which facts should be included within the “transactional
frame” to be evaluated. This problem of “framing transactions,” as Professor Daryl Levinson has
called it, cannot be resolved by simply telling courts to assess the “whole fact pattern” according
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At the same time, we should be careful not to overstate the
guidance-based downsides of a holistic-input decision rule. For one
thing, precedent-based decisionmaking might sometimes clarify and
concretize the substance of a holistic-input test over time, with courts
articulating subsidiary principles, presumptions, and rules of thumb
that help to guide and constrain the test’s application to future cases.196
More importantly, we must remember the baseline against which these
holistic-input tests are being compared—namely, an abstract-input
decision rule that requires the making of a difficult characterization
choice at the outset of its application. If the characterization process
itself turns out to be just as freewheeling and undisciplined as a holistic,
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, then characterization-dependent
decision rules may not prove to be any less amorphous and
unconstrained in operation than their holistic input counterparts.197 In

to one criterion or another, because there still exists the ancillary challenge of determine what
facts to include within the “fact pattern” in the first place. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing
Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002). As Levinson explains:
The question of whether government has harmed some individual citizen (or vice
versa) is meaningful only relative to some transactional frame that determines how
much of that relationship, which of the multitudinous benefits and harms, should be
included within the constitutionally relevant transaction. All the rest, left outside the
transactional frame, will dissolve into the background or baseline from which harm is
measured.
Id. Should it have mattered in Rochin, for instance, if the defendant had had several previous runins with the police? Should it have mattered if the police officers had subjected other defendants
to similarly abusive conduct? Should it have mattered if other members of the police force had
done the same, or for that matter other police departments around the country? The point, in
short, is that even the most capacious constitutional decision rules still require courts to make
threshold choices regarding the definition of the transaction being processed, and that definition
cannot be guided by the content of the decision rule itself.
Notice, however, that the challenge of transactional framing does not vanish when
holistic-input rules are replaced with abstract-input rules. Indeed, where a rule operates on a
characterized input rather than an uncharacterized fact pattern, the problem of arbitrariness
becomes only worse. With an abstract-input rule, a court must first select a transactional frame
and then recharacterize that frame in terms of the input the rule demands. With a holistic-input
rule, by contrast, the court need only select the transactional frame before proceeding to evaluate
it. Thus, while not free from unconstrained definitional choices, holistic-input rules at least carry
the virtue of requiring one such choice rather than two.
196. For an overview of this process, see Coenen, supra note 179, at 653–58.
197. For example, while a fundamental rights approach to substantive due process analysis
may initially seem more structured and predictable than a shocks-the-conscience approach, this
will only be true to the extent that we can identify a structured and predictable approach to
characterizing the right whose fundamentality will prove dispositive of the substantive due
process inquiry. See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process,
Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 858 (2003) (noting that
“without additional guidance about how to determine the appropriate level of generality,” the
fundamental-rights standard “is as indeterminate as any that can be used by a court”).
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sum, we might sometimes have certainty- and predictability-based
reasons for crafting a decision rule in characterization-dependent,
abstract-input terms, but the benefits to be gained in the way of
certainty and predictability may turn out to be more apparent than
real.
Apart from concerns about guidance and predictability, another
set of considerations might militate against reliance on a
characterization-resistant, holistic-input test. These considerations
become apparent when we recall that judges strive for consistency in
deciding constitutional cases, taking care to ensure that their presentday applications of a rule accords with past applications of the rule in
previous cases.198 Where that is so, characterization-dependent
decision rules may permit judges to test for and illustrate precedential
coherence without having to reexamine the factual details of all their
previous cases. Holistic-input rules, by contrast, make it harder for
courts to avoid this time- and labor-intensive task.
To see the point, recall the hypothetical with which this Article
began—namely, I have been tasked with determining whether the
subject of a given photograph is a “thing that makes me happy.” That
task, as we have already seen, implicates difficult characterization
choices: I must choose one out of many possible characterizations of
each picture’s “subject” before asking whether that subject is a thing
that makes me happy. As our discussion here reveals, however, a
simple reform to the operative decision rule could make all my
characterization problems go away. Specifically, rather than look for
pictures whose subjects make me happy, I could instead look for
pictures that, when viewed in their entirety, simply make me happy. In
other words, we avoid the characterization problems associated with
our abstract-input test (“select pictures of things that make you
happy”) by adopting a holistic-input test instead (“select pictures
whose overall effect on you is to make you happy”).
To the extent that each individual application of the decision rule

198. As a real-world matter, of course, the extent to which prior precedents actually constrain
Supreme Court decisionmaking is by no means clear. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent
Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 399 (2007) (“Because the
Supreme Court’s docket is dominated by cases of exceptionally high moral, political, and policy
consequence, the Supreme Court may actually be the last place to look to find actual traces of
stare decisis.”). But even assuming that the Court’s own decisions are only weakly bound by prior
precedent, the Justices might still have reason to care about doctrinal effects on lower court
decisionmaking—decisionmaking that itself may adhere more strongly to both vertical and
horizontal stare decisis norms.
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occurs independently of the others, the first variant of the rule seems
clearly preferable to the second. Why bother with the difficult
intermediate step of characterizing the thing depicted by the picture
when I could instead simply consult my reaction to the picture and
make my decision based on that? But the choice between the rules
starts to look more complicated if I am obligated to adhere to a
consistency norm in selecting pictures from your pile. Simply put, if I
must evaluate Photograph 10 holistically and do so in a manner that
coheres with my previous holistic evaluations of Photographs 1 through
9, then I will likely have to go back and look at all nine of the prior
photographs, figure out why I decided that those photographs made
me feel happy or unhappy, and then determine whether those same
reasons compel me to reach a particular finding in connection with
Photograph 10. If, by contrast, I am asked to evaluate the subject of
Photograph 10 and do so consistent with my previous evaluations of
the subjects of Photographs 1 through 9, I do not need to reexamine
Photographs 1 through 9 themselves. Rather, I need only (a)
characterize a subject out of Photograph 10, (b) refresh my recollection
as the characterized subjects of Photographs 1 through 9, and (c) ask
how my previous evaluations of those subjects should affect my current
evaluation of the newly characterized subject before me. Critically, by
employing a decision rule that operates on characterized inputs rather
than holistic inputs, I obviate the need to consider all the previous
features of all the previous photographs. I need only consult the
simplified list of characterized facts that my previous decisions have
already generated.
Returning to the real world, we might associate similar efficiencypromoting benefits with similarly nonholistic decision rules. For
example, a perhaps underappreciated virtue of a fundamental rights
approach to substantive due process analysis is its tendency to generate
over time a generalized understanding of those rights that do and do
not qualify as fundamental—an understanding that we can quickly
consult when asking how to decide a new case in light of past
precedents.199 Were we instead applying a shocks-the-conscience test,
the only way to ensure fidelity to our past decisions would be to delve
back into the factual details of each prior case and to judge whether
those details, when cross-referenced against each case’s respective
holding, militated against or in favor of a conscience-shocking finding
199. But see Tribe, supra note 52, at 1936 (disparaging “the ‘Trivial Pursuit’ version of the due
process ‘name that liberty’ game arguably validated by Glucksberg”).
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in the case before us. In a world of infinite cognitive resources, this
might be the ideal approach; but where resources are limited, the
characterization-based shortcut might ultimately prove to be the wiser
and more manageable means of achieving precedential consistency.
To be sure, this argument assumes that precedential concerns
should indeed matter when courts decide cases according to a totalityof-the circumstances analysis. It also assumes that the characterization
process itself can be carried out without reference to the facts of prior
cases. Both of these assumptions may turn out to be false, or at least
overstated. Some holistic-input rules might best be applied in a manner
that de-emphasizes consistency and coherence and that instead treats
each case as its own independent problem to be solved by reference to
its own distinctive facts.200 And some characterization-dependent rules
might require courts to consider the facts of previous cases when
determining how to characterize the input at issue in the present-day
case.201 If either proposition is true, then the efficiency-based case for
characterization-dependent doctrine becomes much tougher to make.
The less that precedential considerations should guide a court’s
application of an open-ended test, the lower the number of outside
facts a holistic-input rule will require a court to consider. And the more
that the characterization process requires attention to prior cases’ facts,
the higher the number of outside facts an abstract-input rule will
require courts to consider. Either way, the abstract-input rule would
lose its comparative efficiency-related benefits over its holistic input
counterpart.
C. Neutralized Inputs
A final approach to decision rule design would attack
characterization problems in a different way. Rather than select for
inputs that do not require characterization choices in the first place,
this strategy would acquiesce to the presence of characterization
choices while attempting to minimize their consequences. Call this the
“neutralized-inputs” approach. It attempts to formulate decision rules
in such a way as to confer on characterization choices a set of influences
that are offsetting rather than unidirectional, effectively muting a
choice’s overall effects on the outcome of a particular case.
Means/ends analysis provides an illustrative example. The
200. See Coenen, supra note 32, at 711–13 (considering this possibility).
201. For a discussion considering a precedent-based approach to the characterization process,
see infra Part IV.C.
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standard means/ends test requires that a law be sufficiently related to
a sufficiently important government interest in order to survive
constitutional attack. We earlier saw how characterization choices
might influence the determination of whether a given government
interest qualifies as sufficiently important to pass constitutional
muster. All else equal, interests characterized at a high level of
generality (for instance, “an interest in protecting children”) will more
easily qualify as compelling than interests defined at a lower level of
generality (for example, “an interest in reducing the extent of a child’s
inadvertent exposure to profane language on network television”). But
what we have not yet considered is the possibility that these particular
outcome-influencing dynamics will be counterbalanced by a separate
set of dynamics that run in the other direction. And here, some level of
self-correction may be at work. More specifically, any gains to be had
from a high-generality characterization at the compelling interest stage
of the inquiry may yield corresponding losses at the narrow tailoring
stage. Thus, as Professor Craig Green has suggested, “generality affects
each of these components in opposite ways.”202
Consider, once again, the question presented in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project.203 There, recall, the Court applied
heightened scrutiny in rejecting an as-applied First Amendment
challenge to the federal “material support” statute, brought by
plaintiffs “seek[ing] to facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent purposes”
of foreign groups designated to be terrorist organizations.204 As we
have seen, one can characterize the relevant government interest in
Humanitarian Law Project in a number of different ways.205 Running
from most to least specific, the interest might be characterized as that
of (1) “cutting off support for the lawful, nonviolent activities of
foreign organizations designated as terrorist groups,” (2)
“undermining foreign organizations designated to be terrorist groups,”
202. Green, supra note 17, at 454.
203. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010).
204. Id. at 8. It bears noting that the Court in Humanitarian Law Project never specified the
level of scrutiny that it was applying. See Eugene Volokh, Speech That Aids Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, and Strict Scrutiny, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010, 5:43 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/speech-that-aids-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-strict-scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/JG9M-P8ZE]. What matters for our purposes here, however, is simply that the
Court applied some variation on the means/ends test, inquiring into both the strength of the
government’s interest and the extent to which the law’s restrictions on speech were necessary to
serve that interest. See id. (suggesting that the Court in Humanitarian Law Project did apply strict
scrutiny, while noting the Court’s failure to define the test it was applying).
205. See supra Part II.C.
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(3) “undermining foreign terrorist groups,” (4) “combating terrorism,”
or (5) “promoting national security,” with a bunch of intermediate
options in between. And as the generality level of the government
interest increases, so too should the ease of demonstrating that
interest’s overall importance.206 All else equal, the government will
have less difficulty in highlighting the vital importance of “promoting
national security” than the vital importance of “cutting off support for
the lawful, nonviolent activities of foreign organizations designated to
be terrorist groups.” In that sense, the operative decision rule looks to
be at least somewhat sensitive to characterization choices, with some
characterizations of the facts more likely than others to yield a
government-friendly result.207
But things turn out not to be so simple, as something interesting
happens when we proceed to ask whether the law is sufficiently closely
related to the government interest we have identified. Here, we
encounter something akin to the opposite relationship between
generality levels and justificatory ease: the more generally we have
characterized the government interest, the more difficult it becomes to
demonstrate the requisite means/ends fit. We would have little trouble
demonstrating that the material support statute is necessary to further
the government’s interest in “cutting off support for the lawful,

206. See Green, supra note 17, at 454 (“As an interest is defined more generally, it becomes
more important . . . .”).
207. Militating in the other direction is Professor Dov Fox’s recent suggestion that broadly
defined government interests might actually end up facilitating, rather than frustrating, courts’
efforts to demonstrate the requisite means/ends fit. Fox suggests that broadly defined government
interests might give rise to the phenomenon of “interest creep,” whereby courts permit “an
“uncritical expansion of a government reason that courts have endowed with justificatory force
to swallow discrete sources of concern over time.” See Fox, supra note 6, at 284–85. Put
differently, broadly defined government interests might end up lending support to the
government at both the “weightiness” and “relatedness” stages of the means/ends inquiry, and
they would do so for the simple reason that broadly defined interests bring into play a wider range
of prior progovernment decisions that a reviewing court might invoke. Id. As Fox explains:
Once a court of last resort designates an imprecise interest like national security or
child protection as the canonical kind capable of overriding constitutional guarantees,
agencies and legislatures predictably glom onto it the disparate kinds of concerns that
arise in related controversies. Lower court judges—who do not want their decisions
reversed any more than lawmakers want their policies overturned—approve these
varied concerns in the underspecified terms of that controlling authority without
explaining why or how that interest applies in that new context. Its contours thereby
swell over time to encompass this wide swath of rubberstamped concerns.
Id. at 277. The phenomenon of interest creep might thus provide some reason to be skeptical of
the extent to which the means/ends test can operate successfully as a neutralized-input decision
rule. Interest creep may instead result in broadly characterized interests exerting a uniform and
unidirectional tilt of the means/ends inquiry in the government’s favor.
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nonviolent activities of foreign organizations designated as terrorist
groups”—that objective, after all, is precisely what the material support
statute purports to do. But would the law count as necessary to further
the more generally defined interest in “promoting national security” or
“combating terrorism”? Maybe, but maybe not. The problem is that
the government can “protect national security” or “combat terrorism”
in many more ways than it can “cut off support for the lawful,
nonviolent activities of foreign organizations designated to be terrorist
groups.” And the wider the range of potential means of achieving an
interest, the more likely it becomes that a less restrictive or less
discriminatory means will emerge from the heap—thus demonstrating
that the chosen means was fatally over- or underinclusive with respect
to the interest in question.208 In other words, broadening our
characterization of the government interest may make things easier for
the government (and more difficult for the challengers) when
evaluating the strength of the interest, but it will then make things more
difficult for the government (and easier for the challengers) when
evaluating the degree of fit between the interest and the law.
One might imagine similar mechanisms at work in Article III
standing doctrine. Recall our earlier exploration of the connection
between characterization choices and the redressability prong of the
standing test.209 There, I suggested that courts can stack the deck in
favor of a pro-redressability finding by characterizing injuries in
opportunity-based, as opposed to actuality-based, terms. But when we
recall the additional requirement that an injury must also qualify as
“concrete” and “particularized” (as opposed to “abstract” and
“generalized”), the picture becomes more complicated. A court that
defines an injury in opportunity-based terms might have an easier time
demonstrating redressability than will a court that defines the injury in
actuality-based terms, but it might then have a correspondingly more
difficult time demonstrating concreteness. And conversely, a court that
defines an injury in actuality-based terms may have an easier time
demonstrating concreteness than will a court that defines the injury in
opportunity-based terms, but it will then have a correspondingly more
difficult time demonstrating redressability. The first and third prongs
208. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Stating the governmental
interests at such a high level of generality makes it impossible to show that the mandate is the
least restrictive means of furthering them.”); Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal
Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1992) (“If a court chooses to define
legislative purpose broadly, the statute will likely be underinclusive.”).
209. See supra Part I.C.
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of the Article III test are each sensitive to characterization choices, but
they might be sensitive to those choices in offsetting ways. Thus, while
individual components of the Article III standing test may be
manipulated by strategic characterizations of the relevant injury, the
components taken together might not be.
Self-correcting mechanisms thus strike me as at least a
theoretically possible means of lowering the overall stakes of a given
characterization problem.210 Even if turns out that courts must make
fundamentally arbitrary choices in describing government interests,
injuries, and other doctrinal inputs, perhaps the choices will not much
matter in dictating a decision rule’s application to the input in question.
Still, there are reasons to temper our enthusiasm as to how much a selfcorrection strategy can achieve. Most importantly, even if multiple
components of a doctrinal test predictably respond to an input’s
characterization in different ways, it does not follow that the magnitude
of the responses will be precisely, or even roughly, equivalent. When it
comes to means/ends analysis, for instance, generality levels might
matter more at the first step of the inquiry than at the second, with the
chosen characterization of the government interest exerting a major
influence on whether that interest counts as compelling, important,
legitimate, and only a minor countervailing influence on whether there
is a sufficiently close fit between the interest itself and the law under
review. Similarly, perhaps the characterization of a plaintiff’s injury
will affect courts’ perception of concreteness more substantially than
their perceptions of redressability (or vice versa). In these and other
ways, a characterization choice’s outcome-influencing effects at one
stage of the inquiry might simply overwhelm its purportedly
countervailing effects at another stage of the inquiry.
There is another problem too: the equilibrating potential of a
multipart rule will often work in only one direction. For reasons we
have already seen, the strict scrutiny test might help to neutralize the
210. A further possibility, suggested to me by Jon Romberg, is that a neutralized-input rule
might work in connection with a further rule that allocates to a burden-bearing party the power
to adopt the relevant characterization choice. Cf. infra note 247 (discussing in further detail the
possibility of involving litigants in the making of characterization choices). Thus, for example, a
court might simply instruct the party tasked with, say, demonstrating that a law withstands strict
scrutiny, to identify the characterization that the party wishes the court to use. And the court
would then proceed to work with that characterization choice without asking any further
questions about it. The equilibrating potential of the rule makes this option feasible. The burdenbearing party cannot egregiously manipulate outcomes via its characterization choice because any
outcome-promoting gains conferred by that choice at one part of the inquiry will be offset by
losses incurred at another part of the inquiry.
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effects of characterization choices when it comes to demonstrating the
constitutionality of a suspect law. A broad characterization of the
government interest might support the desired conclusion at the
“compelling interest” stage of the inquiry while undercutting that
conclusion at the “narrow tailoring” stage of the inquiry. But if the aim
is to show that the law fails strict scrutiny, then manipulation via
characterization remains easy to accomplish, as a court could
characterize the relevant interest in narrow and context-specific terms
so as to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the “importance” prong of
the test and thus by extension the test as a whole. So too with standing
doctrine. It may be difficult, as we have seen, for a court to deploy a
single characterization of the relevant injury for purposes of
demonstrating the existence of Article III standing, but it will remain
easy to manipulate the test in the other direction. If, for instance, the
court wants to hear a case, its efforts to accommodate the redressability
prong of the inquiry will frustrate its efforts to accommodate the
concreteness prong, and vice versa. But if a court wishes to avoid
hearing the case, it can easily characterize the relevant injury in terms
that either the abstractness prong or the redressability prong will find
wanting. More generally, the point is simply that self-correcting
mechanisms work only when courts need to demonstrate that all
prongs of a test have been satisfied. But those mechanisms have no
value when the aim is simply to show that one prong of the test has not
been satisfied.211
At the same time, some amount of self-correction may be
preferable to no amount of self-correction, in which case courts should
continue exploring opportunities to utilize the neutralized-inputs
strategy across different areas of doctrine. At one level, this may mean
expanding the already significant presence of means/ends analysis
within constitutional law. At another level, it might mean devising new
decision rules that respond to a single characterization choice in
similarly countervailing ways. To be sure, the presence of neutralized
inputs does not in and of itself provide reason to favor one decision
rule over another; other factors can and should enter into the calculus.
But all else equal, decision rules that respond to characterization
choices in a unidirectional manner might ultimately qualify as less
desirable than those that respond to such choices in an offsetting
manner.
***
211. I am grateful to John Rappaport for a helpful conversation on this point.
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If nothing else, the previous Part suggests that characterization
problems are not likely to go away anytime soon. We may sometimes
be able to avoid these problems by devising targeted-input and holisticinput tests, and we may sometimes be able to neutralize the effects of
our characterization choices by devising decision rules that reduce the
decisional influence of a given characterization choice. But these
modifications will not always be available, and courts will therefore
often find themselves tasked with applying a decision rule whose
outcome depends on a contestable characterization of the input.
Assuming, then, that outcome-influencing characterization choices will
remain a part of the constitutional decisionmaking process, the crucial
question becomes how to confront them.
IV. CONSTRAINING CHARACTERIZATION CHOICES
This Part highlights three types of approaches to the
characterization of constitutional inputs. It first considers the
possibility of providing ex ante guidance regarding the proper level of
generality at which the relevant input should be characterized. It next
focuses on the possibility of results-based characterization, which
proceeds by identifying the factual characterization that maximizes the
likelihood of generating the appropriate-seeming doctrinal result. And
this Part concludes by considering the possibility of precedent-driven
characterization, which treats old characterizations from previous
cases as a guide to rendering new characterizations of present-day
facts. As we will see, each of these strategies carries some promise, but
none offers a foolproof solution to the challenges that the process
poses.
A. Controlling Generality Levels
An initial approach to characterization choices might focus on
levels of generality. Facts can often be characterized in more or less
general terms, and an input’s generality level can significantly influence
doctrinal outcomes. We saw this point on display in Part II. A right is
more likely to qualify as fundamental when we characterize that right
as a lofty abstraction rather than a particularized grievance;212 a rule is
more likely to qualify as clearly established when we characterize it as
a generally applicable prohibition on conduct rather than a particular

212. See supra Part II.A.
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application of that prohibition to the facts of a given case;213 and a
government interest is more likely to qualify as compelling when we
characterize that interest in terms of a big-picture regulatory objective
rather than a targeted and contingent goal.214 All of this being so, courts
might attempt to constrain characterization choices through ex ante
specifications of desired generality levels. In other words, a
characterization-dependent decision rule might carry its own set of
instructions regarding the particular generality level at which its input
should be defined. And with the optimal generality level so prescribed,
subsequent characterization choices could proceed in a controlled,
predictable, and nonarbitrary fashion.
The most familiar example of this strategy comes from a famous
footnote in Justice Scalia’s Michael H. v. Gerald D. opinion.215 There,
Justice Scalia called for an approach to substantive due process cases
that would characterize an asserted right at “the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.”216 Justice Scalia’s prescription—as
Professors Michael C. Dorf and Laurence H. Tribe have noted—had
an “algorithmic” feel: characterize the asserted right at some minimal
level of generality, look for a decisive tradition involving the right so
characterized, and, if no such tradition exists, ratchet up the generality
level and try again.217 The prescription thus sought to constrain
characterization choices by prospectively dictating that a given factual
characterization be pitched at the minimum level of generality that
“tradition” permits.218
The Michael H. approach never won approval from a majority of
the Court, but other, less overt attempts at “generality control” are
arguably present within the case law. In Glucksberg, for instance, a
majority of Justices admonished courts to formulate a “careful
description” of the asserted liberty interest in substantive due process
cases, articulating a requirement that, in practice, appears to favor the
characterization of rights in low-generality terms.219 In the qualified
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion). This footnote
was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
216. Id.
217. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1085.
218. Id. at 1086.
219. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 157 (2015) (claiming that Glucksberg’s
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immunity context, the Court has “repeatedly told” its subordinates
“not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”220
and it has elsewhere noted that “the right allegedly violated must be
defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can
determine if it was clearly established.”221 Strands of the Court’s
nonretroactivity jurisprudence warn against defining the relevant rule
at an “unduly elevated level of generality.”222 The Court has at least
hinted at a preference for low-generality characterizations in the
Commerce Clause context, obliquely observing that “depending on the
level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.”223
And two terms ago, Justice Scalia himself voiced a preference for lowgenerality characterizations in connection with the strict scrutiny test,
reasoning that “[t]he State must . . . identify its objective with precision
before one can tell whether that interest is compelling and whether the
speech restriction narrowly targets it.”224 In various ways, these
statements reflect judicial attempts to cabin characterization choices
through the imposition of generality-based limits. Some such attempts,
like the Michael H. approach, prescribe these limits in detailed terms;
other such attempts are less ambitious, simply warning against the
dangers of taking generality levels too far in one direction. But the
underlying intuition is largely the same: courts might attempt to guide
the characterization process by stipulating the appropriate level of
generality at which the characterized input should be cast.
Prescribing desired generality levels may impose some small
measure of discipline on the characterization process. But, for a variety
of reasons, the strategy is limited in terms of what it can achieve. The
central difficulty is one of measurement: it is often hard to describe
with any precision the threshold point at which the desired level of
generality lies. We may all agree that a court has gone too far up the

“[c]areful description” requirement served as “a transparent Trojan horse” for the command to
employ a “specific description”).
220. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
221. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).
222. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 315 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 344 (1993) (“[T]he level of generality at which respondent
invokes this line of cases is far too great to provide any meaningful guidance for purposes of our
Teague inquiry.”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990) (“The [Teague] test would be
meaningless if applied at this level of generality.”).
223. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
49 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Court’s definition of economic activity is
breathtaking”).
224. Williams-Yulee v. Fl. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1678 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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generality spectrum when it characterizes a claimant’s liberty interest
as amounting to an interest in “enjoying freedom,” and we all may also
agree that a court has gone too far down the generality spectrum when
it characterizes that same liberty interest as amounting to an interest in
“not doing precisely what the government is requiring the claimant to
do in this particular case.” But innumerable other characterization
choices lie between these two extremes, and it is hard to know or even
imagine how one would further specify where within this vast territory
the desired generality-level can be found.225 We have yet to develop a
reliable generality-ometer, capable of assigning to each factual
characterization, say, a generality score between 0 and 100 to be crossreferenced against whatever specified generality value the doctrine
demands. And that in turn leaves us with vague and largely useless
instructions regarding the proper levels of generality to be used. It is,
indeed, telling that the Court’s very few attempts to specify desired
generality levels—e.g., adopt a “careful description” of the liberty
interest, define the relevant rule at an “appropriate level of specificity,”

225. One possibility, raised by Professor David Faigman, might involve a comparative
assessment of generality levels as between multiple, different inputs that factor into a single
doctrinal test. Professor Faigman suggests, for instance, that when courts engage in a “balancing”
of government interests against liberty interests, they should take care to “use the same level of
generality on both sides of the balance.” Faigman, supra note 6, at 780. This is an intriguing idea,
but it too has its limits. For one thing, even if the comparative approach obviates the need to
describe generality levels in an absolute sense, it still leaves open the difficult question of how to
determine whether the generality level of one doctrinal variable is or is not the same as the
generality level of another. More importantly, the comparative approach, even if fully successful,
would enjoy a limited range of application, constraining characterization choices only in
connection with rules that balance one characterized input against another.
A further possibility is suggested by Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, who draws a sharp
distinction between constitutional provisions that concern the validity of congressional action and
those that concern the validity of executive action. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects
of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1224–26 (2010). Specifically, Rosenkranz suggests that
when applying clauses as to whom “Congress” is the relevant subject, courts should accord no
doctrinal significance to any “facts of enforcement” that accompany a particular case. See id. at
1275–76 (noting that “a claim that Congress violated the Constitution by making a law, when it
made the law, is inherently a ‘facial challenge’” and that “specific facts of enforcement cannot
matter here, for the simple reason that the constitutional violation is complete before those facts
arise” (emphasis omitted)). With executive action, however, enforcement-specific facts can and
should figure into the merits-based inquiry. See id. at 1245 (noting that, when the constitutional
inquiry concerns executive action, “the doctrinal test will probably be fact-intensive”).
Rosenkranz’s approach would likely simplify characterization problems to some extent; especially
with respect to Congress-centered norms, his approach would manage to eliminate a number of
potential characterization choices by prescribing high-generality characterizations of the relevant
conduct under review. But difficulties would still remain, as courts would still need to confront
the challenge of deciding which particular legislation-specific facts or enforcement-specific facts
to include when characterizing the particular input that a decision rule demands.
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and so forth—offer about as much in the way of useful guidance as the
encouraging-but-ultimately-banal exhortation to “make it work.”226
Absent a reliable means of describing and measuring generality levels,
generality-based limits on the characterization process will be difficult
to follow and easy to ignore.
We might try to circumvent the measurement problem by
outlining an algorithmic, step-by-step approach to identifying the
proper generality level, but even a framework of this sort is likely to
leave major indeterminacy problems in its wake. Consider again
Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the right being evaluated in a
substantive due process case should be characterized at the most
specific level for which a relevant historical tradition exists. The
instruction sounds alluringly straightforward, but it leaves unanswered
several vital questions: How do we choose the initial characterization
with which to begin our investigation?227 How (and, dare we ask, at
what level of generality) does one identify the relevant tradition to
consult?228 How does one know whether the relevant tradition speaks
to or does not speak to the fundamental status of the characterized
right? If the relevant tradition is indeterminate with respect to a lowgenerality characterization of a liberty interest, how far up the
generality spectrum should we go before we try again? Generality
levels, in short, are difficult to measure, difficult to describe, and
difficult even to compare, and we do not gain much of anything by
attempting to guide the characterization inquiry by the presence or
absence of particular traditions of relevance to a characterized right.
What is more, even if we could figure out a way to specify optimal
generality levels, we would still need to devise a way of constraining
characterization choices within the permitted generality range. The
problem here is that a single set of facts can be plausibly characterized
in multiple ways—even at the exact same level of generality. As Dorf
and Tribe have put the point, there is no “single dimension of

226. See Project Runway (Bravo/Lifetime 2004–present).
227. One might think that this question can be easily answered vis-à-vis an instruction to start
with the lowest possible generality level, but this specification turns out not to help very much. If
the minimum-generality characterization of a right is simply a restatement of all the facts leading
up to a particular rights-based claim, then no “relevant tradition” will ever speak to the existence
of the right. And that in turn means that we need to increase the generality of our characterization
by abstracting away some of the facts with which we began. But then the (very difficult) question
becomes: which facts do we abstract away? See text accompanying infra notes 229–30.
228. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1087.
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specificity” along which a characterization choice proceeds.229 The
universe of available characterizations does not resemble a single line
proceeding from most specific to most general; rather, that universe is
better captured by an outwardly branching tree, with more and more
potential characterizations becoming available the higher up the
generality spectrum we go. Dorf and Tribe illustrate this idea nicely
with respect to Michael H. As they explain:
According to Justice Scalia, if “there were no societal tradition, either
way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously
conceived, [the Court] would have to consult, and (if possible) reason
from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general.” As Justice
Scalia states the problem, after traditions regarding the rights of the
natural father of a child adulterously conceived, traditions regarding
natural fathers in general are the next most specific. But why must
this be so? Why not abstract out the father’s sex, and consult general
traditions regarding parental rights of children adulterously
conceived, and reason from these? Perhaps we can learn something
from the way the law treats natural mothers of adulterously conceived
children. Or alternatively, why not abstract Gerald D. out of the case
and consult traditions regarding unmarried fathers’ rights in
circumstances where the mother was not married to some other man
at the time of conception? In other words, when we find no relevant
tradition concerning asserted right X under conditions 1 and 2, do we
consult traditions concerning right X under condition 1 in general, or
do we consult traditions concerning right X under condition 2 in
general?230

In sum, we cannot count on ex ante instructions regarding
generality levels to provide anything more than very rough-cut limits
229. Id. at 1090.
230. Id. at 1090–91 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)). One way around this difficulty would be to stipulate that the
operative input of a decision rule should be described at the lowest level of generality possible.
But an instruction to maximize specificity (and hence minimize abstraction) in the
characterization of an input would, in practice, be no different from an instruction to consider “all
the relevant facts” (or the “totality of the circumstances”) when disposing of a constitutional
claim. Admonishing courts to “characterize inputs at the maximum possible level of specificity”
is functionally the same as admonishing courts not to characterize inputs in the first place and
instead to apply the relevant decision rule to the entirety of a case’s fact pattern. That holisticinput approach to constitutional decisionmaking, as we have seen, may well be appropriate under
some circumstances. See supra Part III.B. But useful or not, this is not an approach that relies on
characterization at all. Saying then that characterization problems can be solved by instructing
courts to characterize inputs at the maximum possible level of specificity is simply another way of
saying that characterization problems can be avoided by instructing courts to evaluate the totality
of a case’s fact pattern.
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on the characterization choices that a given rule demands. Ex ante
instructions might suffice to discourage characterization choices at the
extreme ends of the generality spectrum, but they rapidly lose their
utility as we move away from those extremes. Generality levels, in
short, are difficult to describe, difficult to measure, and difficult to
compare. What is more, even if clear-cut instructions about generality
levels could be rendered, those instructions would leave unanswered
the critical question of how to choose among the variety of plausible
characterizations that might exist within the desired generality range.
If we are to devise a meaningful approach to the making of
characterization choices, that approach must involve something more
than references to generality levels alone.
B. Results-Based Characterization
A second approach to the input-characterization process would
appeal directly to desired results. Call this the “results-based”
characterization strategy: it proceeds by characterizing inputs in a
manner that helps to generate the appropriate-seeming outcome under
a given doctrinal test. Courts would, in effect, collapse the
characterization of a doctrinal input into the application of the
operative decision rule, citing to a given input’s tendency to satisfy or
not satisfy the rule’s underlying criterion as a reason for or against
characterizing the facts in a particular way.
The Court has sometimes been quite explicit about its willingness
to render characterization choices in this manner. Recall, for instance,
the Court’s changed approach to the question whether state
antisodomy laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
process protections. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court answered in the
negative, finding that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred no
“fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”231 But
the Court subsequently reversed course, finding that the majority in
Bowers had erred by, among other things, characterizing the relevant
right in unduly narrow terms. Specifically, in holding that antisodomy
laws implicated nothing more than a right to engage in a particular
form of sexual activity, the Court in Bowers had “fail[ed] to appreciate
the extent of the liberty at stake.”232 More specifically:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in

231. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage
is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved
in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more
than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes,
though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private
of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished
as criminals.233

This might seem like circular logic, amounting to little more than
a claim that the Bowers characterization was unduly narrow because
the Bowers characterization was unduly narrow. But a better take on
the argument would see it as rooted in the premise that, however one
characterized the liberty interest implicated by antisodomy laws, it was
not one that the government should have been able to impinge. In
other words, the Court in Bowers “misapprehended the claim of liberty
there presented to it”234 precisely because it had adopted a
characterization that supported (rather than undermined) the
conclusion that the liberty interest was nonfundamental. The Court in
Lawrence, by contrast, had implicitly concluded that antisodomy laws
infringed a fundamental right, and it thus chose to characterize the
liberty interest in a manner that conduced to that conclusion. Thus,
rather than proceed from a characterization of the right to an
evaluation of its fundamentality, this argument worked the other way,
with the Court in Lawrence deriving a more capacious characterization
of the liberty interest from what it already perceived to be the
necessary constitutional result.235
Lest one regard this technique as unique to the Lawrence majority,
other cases from other doctrinal areas reveal similar analytical moves.
Consider, for instance, this description of qualified immunity analysis,
authored by Justice Scalia:

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. This observation is consistent with several commentators’ suggestion that Lawrence
involved a significant amount of results-oriented reasoning across the board. See, e.g., Adam
Lamparello, Why Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor Shortchanged Same-Sex Couples, 46
CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 34 (2013) (“Lawrence is the perfect example of using normative
reasoning to establish legal doctrine, instead of using doctrine (and text) to establish
constitutional norms.”).
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The operation of this standard . . . depends substantially upon the
level of generality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to be identified.
For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly
established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in
which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it
may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly
established right. Much the same could be said of any other
constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of “clearly
established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it would
bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is the
touchstone of [the test] . . . . It should not be surprising, therefore, that
our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated
must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.236

Notice in particular how this passage begins with a description of
a characterization problem and ends with a prescription for some form
of fair notice-based reasonableness review. Legal rules, the paragraph
suggests, should be characterized in a sufficiently particularized
manner so as to prevent the withholding of immunity from an officer
who acted reasonably. To know whether a rule has been characterized
properly, one must therefore peek ahead to the subsequent steps of the
inquiry.237 One must ask whether the rule so characterized would
support or undermine a finding of qualified immunity, and one must
then ask whether such a finding would cohere with the objectively
reasonable or unreasonable nature of the officer’s behavior. If so,
adopt the characterization; if not, adopt a different characterization
that would produce the desired result. In other words, rather than
assess an officer’s reasonableness by asking whether the violated rule
was clearly established, make the violated rule as clearly established or

236. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987) (citation omitted) (citing Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)).
237. This idea is reminiscent of Richard Fallon’s suggestion that courts sometimes “peek
ahead” at the potential remedial consequences of a given substantive outcome before deciding
whether to vindicate a legal claim on its merits. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between
Justiciability and Remedies–And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 642
(2006); see also Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1223–44
(2014) (highlighting additional examples of the practice).
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not clearly established as needed to ensure that reasonable conduct is
immunized and unreasonable conduct is not.
The
above-quoted
passages
reflect
express
judicial
acknowledgments of the connection between characterization choices
and desired doctrinal results. But the practice might also occur
implicitly, with courts either secretly or subconsciously turning to
outcome-based considerations to guide their characterizations of the
facts. Want to conclude that Congress has regulated an activity that is
impermissibly noneconomic? Then characterize the activity in
noneconomic terms.238 Want to conclude that a federal law preempts a
state law? Then characterize each law’s regulatory field in broad and
overlapping terms.239 Want to conclude that a plaintiff lacks Article III
standing? Then characterize the plaintiff’s injury as a grievance that
defies easy remediation.240 In short, where the facts alone lend
themselves to myriad different characterizations, courts may simply
(and silently) select the characterization that best justifies an outcome
that they already want to reach.
At first glance, all of this might look rather untoward; indeed,
critics might be quick to dismiss the approach as implicating the everdreaded specter of results-oriented judging. But while abusive or
manipulative instances of results-based characterization choices are
easy to imagine, other instances of the approach might turn out to be
less problematic than first meets the eye. Much depends on what sorts
of considerations are orienting the court toward the decisional
outcome it wishes to reach. Suppose, for instance, that a judge surveys
the facts of a substantive due process case and finds herself struck by
the extent of the burdens that the claimant has endured. The judge
might say to herself: “These facts sure look to me like the facts of a
‘fundamental-rights’-type case,” and she might accordingly
characterize the facts in terms of a right whose fundamentality is
manifest. Similarly, suppose that a judge surveys the facts of a qualified
immunity case and finds herself thinking that the defendant could not
reasonably have known about the illegality of his actions. The judge
might say to herself: “These facts sure look to me like the facts of a
‘not-clearly-established-law’-type case,” and accordingly characterize
the facts in terms of a “rule” whose “clearly established” nature could
not be shown. In sum, where the motivating values of the
238. See, e.g., Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1261.
239. See, e.g., Preemption, supra note 158, at 1067.
240. See Nichol, supra note 135, at 80.
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characterization choice bear a close resemblance to the underlying
values of the decision rule itself, results-based characterization choices
may represent a perfectly legitimate approach to a difficult doctrinal
problem.
But even where a results-based characterization choice derives
from legitimate considerations, there exists another, more serious
problem with the reasoning process that it reflects. The trouble is the
now-apparent pointlessness of the characterization itself. Our
hypothetical judge did not rely on any particular description of the
underlying right reflected by the facts to conclude that she was dealing
with a fundamental-rights-type case, just as she did not need any
particular description of the underlying law to conclude that she was
dealing with a not-clearly-established-law-type case. Rather, she
reached those respective conclusions by engaging with the facts
holistically and consulting her own impressions of those facts. In a very
real sense, then, the mode of her analysis departed from the analysis
that her decision rule described. She did not identify a right and then
consider its fundamentality, nor did she identify a law and then
consider its clearly established nature; rather, she saw in one fact
pattern the trappings of a fundamental rights-type case, and she saw
within another fact pattern the trappings of a not-clearly-establishedlaw-type case. What she characterized as the relevant input of the
decision rule did not in fact operate as an input to her decisionmaking
inquiry. Rather, the relevant input—to the extent there was one—was
simply the entirety of the fact pattern before her.
What all of that suggests is that a results-based approach to
characterization choices—even though capable of offering a coherent,
transparent, and even determinate basis for choosing among
competing characterizations of the facts—will cast doubt on the legal
force of the decision rules it guides. Where courts find themselves
characterizing inputs by reference to desired doctrinal results, they
have not so much arrived at a solution to characterization problems as
they have revealed themselves to be evaluating something other than
the input being characterized. In this sense, the decision rule they
purport to apply will turn out to misdescribe the inquiry being
conducted.
C. Precedent-Driven Characterization
Let us now consider a third approach to the characterization
process, which calls for the making of characterization choices in a
precedent-based manner. At first glance, this approach appears to have
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much going in its favor. Courts, after all, routinely rely on precedents
when applying law to fact, and a broad and well-established body of
case law can help to channel seemingly unbounded legal inquiries. If
common-law-like reasoning can discipline courts’ assessment of
questions like “was this conduct reasonable?,” “was this punishment
cruel and unusual?,” and “was this defendant deprived of due
process?,” then perhaps it can discipline their characterizations of the
facts as well.
An example may help to illustrate the idea. Recall our earlier
discussion of the Court’s varying characterizations of injuries in Article
III standing cases.241 In cases such as Linda R.S. v. Richard D., Warth
v. Seldin, and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
the Court defined the relevant injury as an actual failure to obtain a
desired resource; in cases such as Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, the Court defined the relevant injury as a failure to compete
for the desired resource on an equal footing with others. Suppose that
we now confront a case in which a plaintiff claims that an allegedly
unlawful activity has frustrated her ability to obtain a resource she
desires. We must decide whether the plaintiff has Article III standing,
and to do so, we must further characterize the facts in terms of an injury
that the plaintiff has suffered. How do we decide whether to
characterize the injury in Linda R.S.-like “actuality” terms (to wit, “the
plaintiff’s alleged injury is the failure to obtain the resource she
desires”) or Bakke-like “opportunity” terms (to wit, “the plaintiff’s
alleged injury is the failure to compete for the resource on an equal
basis”)? One seemingly straightforward approach to the problem
would say: “Compare the facts of this case to the facts of Linda R.S.,
Warth, Simon, and Bakke; figure out which of those cases is most
factually similar to the current case; and adopt whatever type of
characterization the most similar case utilized.” The approach, in other
words, seems to require no peeking ahead to the likely outcome of the
Article III standing inquiry. Nor does it seem to suffer from any
obvious indeterminacy problems. It simply calls upon courts to
compare one set of facts to another and to utilize that comparison as
the basis for the characterization choices that they make.242
241. See supra Part II.E.
242. One might understand in similar terms the court’s suggestion in Obergefell that the
relevant right was a “right to marriage” rather than, say, a “right to same-sex marriage.” That
former characterization was appropriate, the Court reasoned, because “Loving did not ask about
a ‘right to interracial marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and
Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.’” See
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Here too, however, our prescribed approach runs into difficulties.
The first difficulty relates back to a point we earlier considered in
assessing the virtues of characterization-dependent decision rules as
compared to totality-of-the-circumstances tests and other rules that
call for a holistic assessment of all the facts.243 A potential advantage of
the former over the latter, I earlier suggested, might relate to the
efficiency of precedential analysis: namely, where a decision rule
operates on characterized facts rather than the totality of a case’s facts,
courts can draw guidance from past applications of the rule without
having to reappraise themselves of the many different fact patterns to
which it previously applied. When, for instance, we ask whether an
injury is concrete enough to pass muster under Article III, the
characterization-dependent nature of Article III standing doctrine
allows us assess the injury’s concreteness without having to scrutinize
every fact of relevance to every prior decision. We can simply compare
our currently characterized injury to previously characterized injuries
and decide whether, in light of those comparisons, the injury should
qualify as concrete. The characterization process, in other words,
forges a sort of informational shortcut along which we can reach
precedentially justified conclusions in a quick and easy manner.
That argument collapses, however, if we must consult prior
precedents in order to render a characterization of the relevant input
itself. If this is true, then the characterization-dependent decision rule
turns out not to alleviate any informational burdens. To be sure, we
need not consider the raw facts of prior cases when we compare the
characterized fact of our case to the characterized facts of previous
cases; but we still must consider the raw facts of those previous cases in
order to figure out what our new, characterized input should be. If, in
other words, we have decided that raw facts of our current standing
controversy warrant an opportunity-based characterization of the
inquiry because and only because those facts line up more closely to
the raw facts of previous cases in which we adopted a similar,
opportunity-based characterizations—then we have lost the benefit of
the informational shortcut that our decision rule had originally seemed
to deliver.244 True, we need not consider all the raw facts of all the
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). In other words, precisely because previous
substantive due process cases involving marriage had characterized the relevant right as a “right
to marriage,” that characterization remained appropriate in Obergefell as well. Yoshino, supra
note 219, at 165–66 (considering a similar interpretation of this passage).
243. See supra Part III.B.
244. In fact, we are worse off now, because we have to consider the nine “raw” facts of cases
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previous cases when evaluating the concreteness of the injury we
characterized—at this stage of the inquiry, we can simply compare our
characterized injury to previously characterized injuries that did and
did not qualify as concrete under our prior decisions. But that is by now
a moot point, as we already had to consult all of those prior facts back
when we were figuring out how to characterize the injury in question.
But even putting to one side concerns about efficiency and
information overload, there exists yet another problem with a
precedent-based approach to the making of characterization choices.
We thus far have spoken as if analogical reasoning proceeds on the
assumption that one set of facts either will be or will not be similar to
another set of facts, full stop. But facts can be similar and dissimilar in
different respects, and the analogical reasoning process must therefore
depend on some additional criterion for evaluating the relevance of the
similarities and dissimilarities that do appear.245 We should not deem
Case A to be controlled by Case B because the respective plaintiffs
have the same first name; but we might have reason to deem Case A to
be controlled by Case B because the respective plaintiffs each acted
recklessly. Some factual connections matter more than others, and a
central challenge of precedential analysis is that of explaining why the
relevant connections matter and why the irrelevant connections do not.
What that in turn means is that precedent-driven characterization
choices must ultimately appeal to some set of values that lie outside the
factual similarities and dissimilarities that they invoke. And if that is
so, then it becomes unclear whether a nominally operative decision
rule is in fact performing any analytical work above and beyond what
the value-driven precedential choices already reflect. This is not, to be
clear, a knock on precedential reasoning itself; there are benefits to
drawing connections across cases, even if doing so presents some tough
analytical choices.246 Rather, my point is simply to question the need
for a decision rule whose input will be determined according to
precedent-based reasoning. One cannot ask whether Case A is
A, B, and C in addition to the three characterized facts that we constructed.
245. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–77 (1987) (“Reasoning
from precedent, whether looking back to the past or ahead to the future, presupposes an ability
to identify the relevant precedent.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 745 (1993) (“The major challenge facing analogical reasoners is to decide when
differences are relevant.”).
246. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139,
1159 (2015) (“Second-best stare decisis reflects the Court’s descriptions of the virtues of
continuity–and the costs of vacillation–by recognizing a presumption of fidelity to precedent and
by separating the treatment of precedent disagreements over interpretive philosophy.”).

COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

818

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/5/2018 3:12 PM

[Vol. 67:743

relevantly similar to Case B without also asking whether the rationale
for Case A’s result supports a similar result in Case B as well. But once
that latter question has been asked and answered, the legal relevance
of the decision rule has diminished if not vanished. Having determined
that two cases are sufficiently similar to warrant similar
characterizations of a given doctrinal input, one has necessarily
determined that the two cases are sufficiently similar to warrant a
similar doctrinal result. And if that is clear, the question once again
emerges: why not cut out the seemingly unnecessary intermediate step
of requiring any sort of characterization in the first place?
Put another way, once we acknowledge that a precedent-driven
characterization choice must incorporate the past dispositions of cases
as the relevant analogical lodestar, our purportedly precedent-based
approach to the characterization process may turn out to be nothing
more than a results-based approach in precedential disguise. Looking
to past decisions for guidance regarding the characterization of
constitutional inputs may be no different from looking to past decisions
for guidance regarding the proper application of the rule to which it
attaches. And if that is true, then it is the desired result, rather than a
previous characterization from the previous case, that is moving the
characterization choice forward. If the similarities between two Article
III standing cases are sufficiently material to warrant similar
characterizations of each case’s relevant injury, they will also be
sufficiently material to warrant the conclusion that each case presents
an injury-in-fact situation. If the similarities between two Commerce
Clause cases are sufficiently material to warrant similar
characterizations of each case’s relevant activity, they will also be
sufficiently material to warrant the conclusion that each case presents
a
noneconomic-activity
situation.
Our
precedent-driven
characterization choices thus end up reproducing the problems
presented by their results-based counterparts—if our characterizations
of the facts are operating as nothing more than post hoc justifications
for results we have independently derived, then the characterizationdependent decision rule serves no meaningful doctrinal purpose.
There remains, of course, the possibility of developing some other
results-neutral basis for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant factual
connections across cases. If such a basis could be developed, then a
precedent-based approach to the characterization process would steer
clear of the problems we associated with its results-oriented
counterpart. But while I cannot disprove the existence of any such a
method, I am skeptical that it will ever be found. I am skeptical, in
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other words, that we can devise a way to make meaningful factual
comparisons across cases without in some way thinking about what the
underlying holding of our current case should be. And thus, once again,
a precedent-driven approach to characterization problems is likely to
buy us coherence and determinacy, but only at the expense of
rendering our decisions nonresponsive to the decision rules that
purport to guide them.
***
We have thus failed to identify an approach to characterization
choices that affords consistent and concrete guidance without
rendering obsolete the decision rules to which they attach.247 That does
247. But perhaps we have been too pessimistic. Even if we fail to develop a fully satisfactory
set of instructions for rendering characterization choices—instructions that usefully channel and
constrain characterization choices without replicating the evaluative choices they are meant to
precede—we might nonetheless develop some satisfactory shortcuts that simplify the approach.
Two possibilities come to mind.
First, courts could rely on common sense. On this view, one need simply consult one’s
initial psychological intuitions regarding the best way to characterize a given constitutional input.
I do not need some abstract theory or scholarly exegesis to explain why I am currently typing this
footnote on a “computer” as opposed to a “metal box,” “calculating machine,” “machine,”
“Apple,” or “keyboard connected to microchips connected to a screen.” All of those descriptions
are technically accurate, but “computer” just seems like the right one to use in this context, even
if I cannot explain precisely why that is so. And perhaps a similar point holds for the
characterization choices that judges must make. It does not take extensive legal analysis, some
might argue, to see why the Gun Free School Zones Act regulates the activity of “gun possession
in a school zone” as opposed to the activity of “gun-based school endangerment” or something
more abstract. The former just seems obviously correct, one might argue, and the latter just seems
ridiculous. Judges have to make characterization choices all of the time, and perhaps it is simply
enough to say that they should continue to do so by reference to whatever hunches and intuitions
have guided them in the past.
But even if we concede that there exist commonsensical solutions to some characterization
choices, it is unlikely that our intuitions will always identify an obvious path forward—especially
with respect to the sorts of “hard,” unresolved questions that we have grappled with in this
Article. In addition, it may sometimes be difficult to disaggregate our intuitions about how a case
should be decided from our intuitions about what the appropriate characterization of an input
should be. If so, then the “commonsensical” approach collapses into the results-based approach
we have already considered and critiqued. See supra Part IV.B. And finally, though commonsense
intuitions represent a perfectly appropriate basis for characterizing the things around us in daily
life, it is unclear whether such a “just take my word for it” approach reflects an appropriate basis
for the making of legal choices—choices that should be justified rather than simply proclaimed.
See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL. 123, 169–70
(2011) (noting that “judges are expected to explain the reasons for the interpretive choices they
make”).
A second potential strategy might attempt to farm out characterization choices to the
parties litigating a case, with judges choosing an authoritative input characterization from a pool
of potential characterizations that the litigants propose. If the parties agree to a single
characterization choice, the choice gets made for the court and no further effort is required.
Otherwise, the parties will have at least narrowed the choice down to a handful of candidates out
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not mean that no such approach exists; perhaps, for instance, generality
levels can be measured and identified with greater objectivity than I
have suggested, perhaps courts could employ some optimal hybrid
approach that combines generality-based, results-based, and
precedent-based reasoning, or perhaps they could turn to some other
set of guiding criterion that I have neglected altogether. But to the
extent courts have at their disposal a set of fail-safe, foolproof, and
doctrine-preserving approaches to characterizing constitutional inputs,
I have not managed to put my finger on any such approaches here.
V. CHARACTERIZING CONSTITUTIONAL OUTPUTS?
Let us assume, then, that the only reliable means of rendering
characterization choices is to identify desired outcomes and to choose
a characterized input that conduces to that outcome. If true, that
conclusion should cast doubt on the utility of prescribing
characterization-dependent decision rules; it should suggest in
particular that such decision rules will fail to guide judicial
decisionmaking any more effectively than various characterization-

of a multitude of possibilities, and the adversarial nature of the judicial process will help to ensure
that each respective candidate reflects a plausible, if somewhat tilted, solution. In effect, courts
would enlist the machinery of the adversarial system in an effort to simplify the decision before
them—in much the same way that they sometimes solicit parties’ assistance in preparing jury
instructions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 51(a), flagging trial court errors, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)
(restricting appellate review of errors not identified at trial), identifying grounds for appeal, see,
e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (noting that “we rely on the parties to
frame the issues for decision”), and so forth, see Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE
L.J. 447, 455–70 (2009) (identifying several examples of (and exceptions to) the “party
presentation norm”).
The party-driven approach strikes me as promising—and certainly worthy of much more
exploration than I have been able to offer here. But two points, I think, must be kept in mind.
First, even if party-driven choices manage to narrow the range of candidate inputs for a court to
choose from, there still exists the critical question of how to select a winner from the candidates.
And since the parties will likely propose candidate inputs that conduce to their respective
positions in a case, that selection choice will remain just as consequential as a choice that was
made without the parties’ initial assistance. Second, party-driven characterization is susceptible
to the criticism that it delegates a core component of judicial power away from the courts.
Compare, e.g., Frost, supra, at 483 (noting that “[j]udicial independence, and the respect for
judicial decisionmaking that accompanies it, would be compromised if courts were required to
rule on the law as it is presented to them, rather than as they believe it to be”), with Gary Lawson,
Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2011) (observing that “standard American
practice does not generally allow parties to stipulate to legal conclusions,” while contending “that
it should”). Thus, even if it represents a promising means of simplifying characterization
problems, the party-driven approach might amount to a constitutionally problematic abdication
of the courts’ authority to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803).
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resistant alternatives that might instead be used. That conclusion, in
turn, should prompt us to reconsider the question whether
characterization-dependent decision rules ought ever to factor into the
doctrine at all. If characterization choices simply function as a stand-in
for holistic, all-things-considered assessments of facts and prior
precedents, why not simply instruct courts to perform those
assessments directly and on their own terms?
The remaining question thus becomes whether characterizationdependent decision rules—rules, for instance, that turn on the
fundamentality of an asserted right, the clearly established nature of a
violated law, the economic nature of a regulated activity, and so forth—
could furnish any doctrinal value apart from that of constraining
judicial outcomes. If, in other words, characterization-dependent
decision rules offer nothing in the way of increased predictability and
control when it comes to reaching judicial results, should they simply
be jettisoned altogether or might we still have good reason to keep
them around?
While an in-depth analysis of this question lies beyond the scope
of the Article, I want to sketch out one potential response that a
proponent of characterization might give. Conceding that
characterization-dependent decision rules do not help to determine
constitutional results, the response would maintain that such rules
remain a useful means of communicating the results once reached. In
a nutshell, the claim is this: characterization-dependent decision rules
are best understood as output- rather than input-focused. Their
primary virtue lies not in dictating or determining judicial outcomes,
but rather in situating those outcomes within a single, continuous, and
easy-to-digest narrative about the development of the law through
time. Characterizations of the facts might in this sense operate not so
much as a necessary first step to the process of determining a case’s
result, but rather as a useful sort of justificatory glue that helps to
connect up that result with the results of past cases. If constitutional
adjudication turns out to resemble the task of writing a chain novel,248
characterization-dependent rules might provide the vocabulary
necessary to help that novel read smoothly.
Specifically, the argument would begin by inviting us to reconsider
the models of constitutional adjudication that we developed in Part I,
248. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 229–38 (1986); see also Tribe & Dorf, supra
note 6, at 1072–77 (discussing Dworkin’s analogy that using precedent is like “the composition of
a chain novel”).
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proposing instead a model that looks like this:
Figure 3: Alternative Model of Constitutional Adjudication

Like our previous models, this model highlights law identification
and fact identification as the initial steps of the decisionmaking process.
But at this point the models would diverge. Whereas the previous
models saw the law identification process as yielding a decision rule
that courts would then apply to a characterized fact, this model depicts
the identified law as some body of sources with relevance to the legal
question before the court—sources a court would then consider in
conjunction with the entirety of a case’s facts before exercising a
judgment from which the actual judicial outcome derives. The case’s
outcome, in other words, no longer depends on a characterization of
the facts and an application of a decision rule to the characterized fact;
rather, its outcome depends on an unfettered (and largely
indescribable) exercise of human judgment—a judgment that attempts
to account for and respond to all the factual and legal data that the factand law-identification processes have respectively produced.
But identifying the appropriate outcome does not end the judge’s
work; there remains the task of translating judgment into
justification—the task of communicating to the public the reasons why
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the outcome is the appropriate one to reach. It is only here that the
characterization process enters the picture. Specifically, the judge
proceeds to recast (a) the large and complex body of legal precedents
that she worked with in terms of a single legal decision rule that all of
those precedents can be read to support; and (b) the large and complex
body of factual information that she worked with in terms of the single
characterized input to which that decision rule applies. From here, one
final step remains: that of explaining why the characterized fact does
or does not satisfy the evaluative criteria of the decision rule itself.
With that model in place, we can now return to the question with
which this Part began: Why bother with the characterization process at
all? The best answer to this question, I think, would have to appeal to
the value of showcasing apparent continuity across cases. By explaining
its judgments in terms of decision rules and characterizations of the
facts, courts can employ a vocabulary of justification that facilitates
easy comparisons to and from other constituent components of the
case law. This language allows them to direct attention away from
surface-level dissimilarities by noting higher-level similarities across
the relevant interests, rights, activities, fields, or purposes manifested
by these fact patterns. It allows them to seize on other, perhaps subtler
similarities by characterizing the facts in terms that bring those
similarities to the forefront. It perhaps even allows them to foreshadow
and encourage future doctrinal developments by highlighting within a
present-day fact pattern a new type of characterized fact with emerging
legal significance. In short, to the extent that judges wish to articulate
a smooth and linear narrative about the development of the law over
time, the characterization process may turn out to useful to that goal.
To be sure, judges might still be able to highlight doctrinal
connectivity without resorting to characterization-heavy justifications
of the legal and factual sources before them. It may be possible, for
instance, to draw out clear and simple connections across substantive
due process cases without ever speaking of a single unifying right that
those cases involved, just as it may be possible to draw out clear and
simple connections across Article III standing cases without ever
speaking of a single unifying injury that all those cases share. But this
is where the open-ended nature of the characterization process might
turn out to be a feature rather than a bug. Characterized inputs, unlike
raw facts, can be tweaked and tailored to line up with the previous
characterized facts that they “need” to line up with. For example, if two
cases look different in one respect, that difference can be downplayed
via the use of strategic characterizations that make the two cases look

COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

824

1/5/2018 3:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:743

more alike. Similarly, if two cases look similar in another respect, that
similarity can be downplayed via the use of characterizations that bring
a less immediately apparent distinction to the fore. All of this might
well be achievable in a world that abjures abstract-input decision rules
and the characterization choices that they require. Nevertheless,
characterization-dependent decision rules might still carry the virtue of
making the outcome somewhat easier for courts to achieve.
What the characterization process thus accomplishes is the
perhaps-valuable task of drawing out thematic connections across
cases and showcasing continuity where chaos and randomness would
otherwise reign. Even where prior decisions fail to dictate future
outcomes, courts might still have reason to cast those outcomes in
terms that resonate and accord with the prior decisions ex post. The
effect may be largely artificial—akin to that of tracing out a
constellation amongst a cluster of unrelated stars—but perhaps the
appearance of order and continuity across cases remains worth
achieving for its own sake.249 I’m not sure. On the one hand, it looks
like deception; but on the other hand, it may simply describe what
precedent-based decisionmaking has always set out to do.
CONCLUSION
Input-characterization problems might best be seen as a
byproduct of the Court’s efforts to generate outcomes that are
consistent in relation to prior decisions and correct in relation to casespecific facts. Characterization-dependent decision rules resemble
their targeted-input counterparts in that they prescribe structured
assessments of specified inputs rather than freewheeling assessments
of everything. But they also resemble their holistic-input counterparts
in that the inputs themselves are capacious enough to accommodate
some level of tailoring to the individual demands of each case. These
decision rules, in short, thus attempt to have their cake and eat it too—
imposing a coherence-promoting structure on the decisionmaking
inquiry while leaving enough play in the joints to avoid anomalous249. In a recent article, Professor Adam Samaha has drawn attention to a variety of ways in
which appearance-based concerns might justify government action, regardless of underlying
realities. A good example involves campaign finance regulation, which, according to the Court
itself, might validly serve a governmental interest in reducing the public appearance of corruption,
even where actual corruption is unlikely to occur. See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake
of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1599–1620 (2012). Whether a similar sort of appearancebased justification might succeed at vindicating the Court’s own utilization of characterizationdependent decision rules is a question that ultimately lies beyond the scope of this article.
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seeming judicial results.
What this Article has suggested, however, is that the coherencepromoting benefits of characterization-dependent decision rules may
turn out to be more illusory than real. As long as we lack a predictable
and results-neutral approach to the making of characterization choices,
the tests that they affect may turn out to be no less all-encompassing
and unconstrained than their holistic-input counterparts. In other
words, characterization-dependent decision rules might seem to
prescribe approaches to decisionmaking that usefully channel judicial
discretion but in reality will involve the same sort of all-thingsconsidered decisionmaking that they purport to disallow.
It remains to be asked whether the appearance of doctrinal
coherence might ever be worth pursuing in its own right. Even where
the doctrine fails to predict, constrain, or control judicial outcomes in
a meaningful way, perhaps courts might still have reason to “talk
about” that doctrine in a manner that highlights themes of continuity
and consistency over time. This is an issue I have not here resolved, but
I hope at least to have highlighted its stakes. If we value apparent
coherence, then characterization-dependent decision rules might carry
the useful purpose of making constitutional law seem to be more
orderly than it actually is. If not, then it becomes more difficult to
justify their continued presence within the law.

